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MUNICATIONS PRIVILEGE DOES NOT PRECLUDE A THIRD PARTY
FROM TESTIFYING AS TO THE CONTENTS OF A WRITrEN INTERSPOUSAL COMMUNICATION AND THE PRIEST IS THE SOLE HOLDER
OF THE PRIEST-PENITENT PRIVILEGE AND CAN WAIvE THAT PRIVI-

LEGE WITHOUT THE CONSENT OF THE PENITENT-State

v. Szem-

p/e, 135 NJ. 406, 640 A.2d 817 (1994).
Evidentiary rules serve two main functions in the judicial system: to exclude evidence and to aid the truth-seeking process.'
Those rules which exclude evidence do so either to omit unreliable
evidence or to promote an extrinsic social policy.2 Privileges are
rules that exclude otherwise admissible evidence in furtherance of
1 Developments in the Law: Privileged Communications,98 HARv. L. REv. 1450, 1454
(1984-85) [hereinafter Developments]. Evidence rules were established for five fundamental reasons. CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE UNDER
THE RuLEs 1 (1988). The first and overriding reason for evidentiary rules was society's mistrust of juries. Id. For example, society's belief that a typical jury cannot
properly consider statements made outside the jury's presence led to the creation of
the hearsay rule. Id. In a legal system which assigns great responsibility to the jury,
such a rule exemplifies the mistrust ofjuries pervasive in our society. Id. The second
reason was to advance substantive policies associated with the litigated issue. Id. For
example, rules setting and allocating the burden of persuasion affect the outcome of
litigation by requiring a higher standard of proof in situations where the suing party is
partially at fault. Id. at 1-2. The third reason for the establishment of evidendary
rules was to promote extrinsic substantive policies not related to the litigated issue.
Id. at 2. Privileges, the primary example of such rules, seek to affect behavior outside
the courtroom. Id. The fourth reason was to guarantee accurate fact-finding. Id.
The best evidence rule, which requires that the original document be entered into
evidence to prove the content of that document, and rules governing the authenticity
of documents and other evidence provide the best examples of such rules. Id. These
rules force litigatory parties to be careful and accurate in their presentation at trial.
Id. The fifth reason for evidence rules was to control the duration and the scope of
trials. Id. These rules authorize the court to organize and limit the dispute so that
the judicial process efficiently attains a final result. Id.
2 EDWARD J. IMWINKELRID, EVIDENTIARY FOUNDATIONS 201 (1980). Examples of
rules excluding unreliable evidence include: the best evidence rule, the opinion rule,
and the hearsay rule. Id. For example, the hearsay rule makes inadmissible any statement within the definition of hearsay unless an exception specifically applies. FED. R.
EviD. 802. Hearsay is defined as "a statement, other than one made by the declarant
while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the
matter asserted." FED. R. EvID. 801(c). Excluding such out-of-court statements
reduces the risks of misperception, misstatement, distortion, and faulty memory.
MELLER & KIRKPATRIcK, supranote 1, at 117-18. Alternatively, privileges may exclude
reliable evidence to protect extrinsic social policies unrelated to the truth-seeking
purpose of courts. James J. Dalessio, Comment, Evidentiaty Pitileges and the Exclusion
of Derivative Evidence: Commentay and Analysis, 26 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 625, 629-30
(1989). An example of such a policy includes fostering communication within relationships that society deems socially desirable, such as the attorney-client or doctorpatient relationship. Id. at 631-35.
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social policies unrelated to the judicial process.' One such extrinsic social policy is the protection of confidential or privileged communications. 4 Confidential communications enjoy protection for
the unique reason that their disclosure is inimical to the societal
interest in preserving and fostering the relationship in which they
transpire.5 Conferral of a privilege, however, results in the exclu3 MICHAEL M. MARTIN, BASIC PROBLEMS OF EVIDENCE 147 (6th ed. 1988). Privilege

is defined as "[a] particular and peculiar benefit or advantage enjoyed by a person,
company, or class, beyond the common advantages of other citizens." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1197 (6th ed. 1990). There are two types of privileges: viatorial and testimonial. 8 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAw § 2197, at 113
(McNaughton rev. 1961). Viatorial privileges exempt evidence because they excuse a
witness from attendance at trial. 8 id. The viatorial privilege exempts the witness
from travel and attendance provided that the witness has not received notice that the
court required and summoned his or her testimony, that the court did not compensate the witness in advance for his or her related expenses, and that the court did not
previously or subsequently excuse the witness for reasons constituting an inability to
attend. 8 id. at 113-14.
By comparison, the testimonial privilege prevents disclosure of evidence because
of the topic or the communication it affects. 8 id. at 114. Privileged communications
are recognized as testimonial privileges due to the confidential relationships in which
they transpire. 8 id. Excluding the substance of those communications, despite reliability, promotes an extrinsic social policy unrelated to the truth-seeking process. Dalessio, supra note 2, at 630.
4 Mary Harter Mitchell, Must Clergy Tell? Child Abuse Reporting Requirements Versus
the Clergy Privilege and FreeExercise of Religion, 71 MINN. L. REV. 723, 762 (1987); see also
infra note 5 (discussing the reasons underlying the creation of privileges). Confidential communication is defined as a "statement made under circumstances showing
that [the] speaker intended [the] statement only for [the] ears of [the] person addressed." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 298 (6th ed. 1990).
5 GRAHAM C. LILLY, AN INTRODUCTION To THE LAw OF EVIDENCE § 86, at 317
(1978). The traditional justification, known as the utilitarian approach, asserts that
the communication should only be privileged if it serves a greater purpose to society.
Developments, supra note 1, at 1472. Under this justification, Wigmore set out four
conditions for the establishment of a privilege:
(1) The communications must originate in a confidence that they will not
be disclosed.
(2) This element of confidentiality must be essentialto the full and satisfactory maintenance of the relation between the parties.
(3) The relation must be one which in the opinion of the community
ought to be sedulously fostered.
(4) The injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure of the
communications must be greater than the benefit thereby gained for the
correct disposal of litigation.
8 WIGMORE, supra note 3, § 2285, at 527 (footnote omitted). Further examples of
privileges include: 1) physician-patient; 2) attorney-client; 3) priest-penitent; and 4)
husband-wife. 8 id. at 528.
Commentators have recently advanced a privacy rationale as an alternative to the
utilitarian theory. Dalessio, supra note 2, at 636. The privacy rationale strives to protect the right of the individual to have control over highly personal information. Id.
The rights and interests are personal to the holder of the privilege, hence personal
information will not be disclosed without the holder's consent. Id. Another justifica-
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sion of potentially reliable evidence.6 Hence, courts frequently
tend to construe privileges narrowly. 7 Nevertheless, some privileges enjoy near universal recognition.' Examples of such privileges include the marital communications privilege9 and the priestpenitent privilege. 10
Created at common law, the marital communications privilege
protects confidential spousal communications." Such a privilege
promotes confidences which consequently foster the inviolability
of the marital relationship.12 The privilege, however, only extends
tion for privileges, the power/image theory, seeks to protect the image of the judiciary. Robert S. Catz &JillJ. Lange,JudicialPrivilege,22 GA. L. REv. 89, 99 (1987). This
theory contends that privileges prevent the embarrassment of courts and legislatures
by protecting communication within relationships from which the system would normally be unable to compel obedience. Id. at 99-100. The inability of the court to
compel disclosure from a party in a confidential relationship could erode public perception of the court's authority. Id. at 99. Simply creating a privilege in such cases
avoids this problem. Id.
6 Dalessio, supra note 2, at 630. Frequently, evidence with substantial probative
value and trustworthiness could be derived from the privileged communications.
LiLLy, supra note 5, § 86, at 317. Therefore, privileges result in "the suppression of
probative evidence and makes the trier decide factual issues without its benefit." Id.
7 Dalessio, supra note 2, at 630.
8 Id. While most jurisdictions may recognize the same privileges, they often vary
in scope, form, or interpretation. Catz & Lange, supra note 5, at 104.
9 Catz & Lange, supra note 5, at 104, 105. The marital communications privilege
protects confidential communications between spouses. Id. at 105.
10 Id. at 104,105-06. The priest-penitent privilege applies generally to communications between a penitent and a clergyperson as defined by the relevant statute. Id. at
105-06. For a detailed discussion of the marital communications privilege and priestpenitent privilege, see infra notes 11-16, 17-25 and accompanying text. For the purpose of this Note, "priest-penitent" privilege will be used to refer to this privilege for
consistency purposes, although other works refer to it in many other forms. The word
"priest" indicates ordained clergypersons or clerics of all denominations and is not
meant to be gender exclusive.
11 LILLY, supra note 5, § 87, at 320. Marital privileges exist in two forms: the
spousal testimonial privilege and the marital communications privilege. Catz &
Lange, supra note 5, at 105. The spousal testimonial privilege enables a party to preclude testimony by his or her spouse, or confers upon a witness the right to decline to
testify against a spouse. Id. The marital communications privilege protects communications intended to be confidential between spouses. Id.
The English Evidence Amendment Act of 1853 provided that "[n]o husband
shall be compellable to disclose any communication made to him by his wife during
the marriage, and no wife shall be compellable to disclose any communication made
to her by her husband during the marriage." The Evidence Amendment Act, 1853,
16 & 17 Vict., ch. 83, § 3 (Eng.). The Act dearly established a distinct marital communications privilege. Steven N. Gofman, Note, "Honey, The Judge Says We're History":
Abrogating the MaritalPrivileges Via Modern Doctrinesof MaritalWorthiness, 77 CORNELL L.
REv. 843, 848 n.26 (1992).
12 LtLY, supranote 5, § 87, at 320. The privilege fosters the marital relationship by
encouraging spouses to share their intimate thoughts and secrets, thus adding intimacy and support to the marriage. Id.; see also Gofman, supra note 11, at 843 (stating
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to confidential statements made between spouses during the existence of a legal marriage. 13 The courts recognize a rebuttable presumption that all communications between spouses are
confidential in nature. 1 4 Determinations by the courts regarding
what circumstances overcome the presumption of confidentiality
have varied, especially when dealing with a communication that
has been intercepted by a third party. 5 Ultimately, the scope of
that "marital privileges evolved because courts and legislatures, by implication, determined that protecting the harmony of legal marital unions was more important than
truth-seeking at trial") (footnote omitted).
13 Gofman, supra note 11, at 850. Courts have refused to extend the privileges to
unmarried cohabitants, sham marriages, and common law marriages. Id. In these
situations the courts and legislatures draw inferences about marital viability and
premarriage acts to determine whether the marital privileges apply. Id. at 855.
Applicability of marital privileges and the existence of a legal marriage are not
discrete issues for judicial determination; rather, the determination of one issue directly influences the latter. See id. at 844 ("Thus, courts and legislatures applying the
marital privileges must look to state law for a definition of legal marriage.") (footnote
omitted). Courts and legislatures have severely narrowed marital privileges through
the application of three principles of marital worthiness: the marital viability doctrine; the Trammel rule; and the premarriage acts exception. Id. at 845. The viability
doctrine denies the marital privileges to nonviable marriages even if such marriages
are legally valid and nonfraudulent. Id. at 860. The Trammel rule, which applies only
in federal criminal trials, posits that only the spousal witness may exercise the adverse
testimonial privilege. Id. at 855; see also Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 53
(1980) ("[We conclude that the existing rule should be modified so that the witnessspouse alone has a privilege to refuse to testify adversely.. . ."). The premarriage acts
exception bars application of the adverse testimonial privilege to testimony concerning events that occurred before the marriage. Gofman, supra note 11, at 866. These
doctrines redefine legal marriage. Id. at 872.
14 Anne N. DePrez, Note, Pillow Talk, Grimgrihbersand Connubial Bliss: The Marital
Communication Privilege, 56 IND. L.J. 121, 128 (1980); see also 1 CHARLEs TILVoRD MCCORMICK ET AL., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 80, at 299 (John William Strong, ed., 4th

ed. 1992) ("Communications in private between husband and wife are assumed to be
confidential ... .") (footnote omitted). The presumption may be rebutted, however,
if either the circumstances surrounding the communication or the contents of the
communication itself indicate that it was not intended to be confidential. DePrez,
supra, at 128-29; see, e.g., State v. Curtis, 334 S.W.2d 757, 763 (Mo. Ct. App. 1960)
(explaining that the presumption of confidentiality does not apply to interspousal
communications concerning business matters). The presumption is generally justified on the basis that spouses engage in confidential communications without an express request of confidentiality and therefore intent may be difficult to establish.
DePrez, supra, at 129.
15 1 McCoRMICK, supra note 14, § 80, at 299-300; see, e.g., Pereira v. United States,
347 U.S. 1, 6 (1954) (concluding that the presence of third persons at the time of
communications will rebut the presumption of confidentiality); United States v.
Kahn, 471 F.2d 191, 194 (7th Cir. 1972) (determining that the marital communications privilege does not preclude testimony regarding illegal activity) (quotation omitted), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 986 (1973), rev'd on other grounds,415 U.S. 143 (1974); State
v. Smith, 384 A.2d 687, 692-93 (Me. 1978) (recognizing that the presence of a third
party defeats the privilege); Curtis, 334 S.W.2d at 763 (explaining that the presumption of confidentiality does not apply to marital communications concerning business
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the marital communications privilege hinges upon its16narrow construction by the courts, as required by public policy.
The priest-penitent privilege similarly presents problems of interpretation and construction for the judiciary.17 The priest-penitent privilege originated in the Catholic Church with the Seal of
Confession."8 The fundamental rationale behind the privilege is
the encouragement of the priest-penitent relationship. 9 This relationship furthers the general societal interest in creating socially
desirable relationships."0 Though not recognized at common
matters); Hicks v. Hicks, 155 S.E.2d 799, 802 (N.C. 1967) (declaring that the presence
of an eight year-old does not destroy the privilege because the child is too young to
understand the meaning of the communication).
16 See Gofman, supra note 11, at 850 (stating that "[b]ecause both marital privileges are contrary to truth-seeking, all jurisdictions have held that courts must construe them narrowly") (footnote omitted).
17 Raymond C. O'Brien & Michael T. Flannery, The Pending Gauntlet to FreeExercise:
Mandating That Clergy Report Child Abuse 25 Loy. LA. L. REv. 1, 33 (1991). Those
problems of interpretation typically arise as a result of the statutory provisions which
define the scope of the privilege. Id.; see infranotes 121 & 137 (providing the relevant
statutory provisions).
18 Id. at 31. The Seal of Confession prevents priests from disclosing the content of
communications exchanged during confession. Mitchell, supra note 4, at 735. In the
Roman Catholic Church, confession is sacramentalized. Lori Lee Brocker, Note, Sacred Secrets: A Call For the Expansive Application and Interpretationof the Clergy-Communicant Privilege, 36 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 455, 458 n.18 (1992). Sacraments are those rites
Christians are expected to participate in and partake of throughout their lives because the rites reflect the teachings ofJesus. Id. Penance, recognized by the Roman
Catholic Church as one of seven sacraments, involves the confession and repentance
of sins. Id. The Seal of Confession, as compiled in the Canon Law, governs the confidentiality of confession. Id. at 459 n.21. The Code of Canon Law explains the Seal of
Confession, providing in pertinent part: "[t]he sacramental seal is inviolable; therefore, it is a crime for a confessor in any way to betray a penitent by word or in any
other manner or for any reason." 1983 CODE c.983, § 1. The Code further provides
that "[e ] ven if every danger of revelation is excluded, a confessor is absolutely forbidden to use knowledge acquired from confession when it might harm the penitent."
1983 CODE c.984, § 1. The penalties for violating the Seal include automatic excommunication for direct violations and punishment "in accord with the seriousness of
the offense" for indirect violations. 1983 CODE c.1388, § 1.
19 Mitchell, supra note 4, at 762. In the Roman Catholic Church, the Seal of Confession was part of the Sacrament of Penance which requires that a penitent sincerely
confess his or her sins and resolve themselves before God. O'Brien & Flannery, supra
note 17, at 5 n.24. Canon 983 states that the Seal of Confession is inviolable and that
violation of the Seal is a crime. 1983 CODE c.983, § 1. Any clergyperson or penitent
who acts within the context of the sacrament is protected through the Seal of Confession and arguably should be able to invoke the protection of the priest-penitent privilege. O'Brien & Flannery, supra note 17, at 34.
20 See O'Brien & Flannery, supra note 17, at 37 (quoting In re Grand Jury Investigation, 918 F.2d 374, 383 (3d Cir. 1990)). Socially desirable relationships are those
which "society deems worthy of preserving and fostering." LnLv, supra note 5, § 86, at
317. Socially desirable status is one of the four conditions proffered by Dean Wigmore as necessary to establishment and recognition of a privilege. 8 WIMoRE, supra
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law,2 1 the priest-penitent privilege has been statutorily created in
every American jurisdiction.2 These statutes differ from state to
note 3, § 2285, at 527. The condition requires that to enjoy privileged status "It]he
relation must be one which in the opinion of the community ought to be sedulously
fostered." Id. In analyzing the propriety of the priest-penitent privilege, Dean Wigmore determined that the privilege satisfied this condition because the United States
promotes considerable religious tolerance and, further, many citizens practice a religion that advocates a confessional system. Id. § 2396, at 878.
21 Jane E. Mayes, Note, Striking Down the Clergyman-Communicant Privilege Statutes:
Let FreeExercise of Religion Govern, 62 IND. L.J. 397, 397 (1987). English common law
first recognized the Seal of Confession in 1066, after the Norman Conquest. O'Brien
& Flannery, supra note 17, at 31. After the Reformation, however, English common
law no longer recognized the privilege. Id. at 32. Accordingly, most American courts
did not recognize the privilege unless imposed by statute. Id. The first United States
case to address the priest-penitent privilege, People v. Phillips,relied on constitutional
theory rather than on public policy. Id. In that case, decided in 1813, the New York
Court of General Sessions concluded on the basis of free exercise of religion that a
priest should not be compelled to disclose confidential spiritual communications.
Privileged Communications to Clergymen, 1 CATH. LAw. 199, 209 (1955) (reprinting the
original, unreported opinion). The court emphatically averred that:
Although we differ from the witness and his brethren, in our religious
creed, yet we have no reason to question the purity of their motives, or
to impeach their good conduct as citizens. They are protected by the
laws and constitution of this country, in the full and free exercise of
their religion, and this court can never countenance or authorize the
application of insult to their faith, or of torture to their consciences.
Id. Four years later, in People v. Smith, another New York court failed to extend the
privilege to a Protestant minister. Id. (reprinting the original, unreported opinion).
The Smith court drew a distinction between a Catholic priest operating within the
canons of the Church and a minister acting in a merely advisory capacity. Id. at 211.
22 Mayes, supra note 21, at 397; see also ALA. CODE § 12-21-166 (1986); ARiz. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 12-2233 (1994); Am CODE ANN. RuLE 505 (Michie 1994); CAL. EVID.
CODE §§ 1030-34 (West 1966); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-90-107 (West 1989); CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-146(b) (West 1991); DEL. CODE ANN. RuLE 505 (1991); D.C.
CODE ANN. § 14-309 (1989); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.505 (West 1979); GA. CODE ANN.
§ 24-9-22 (1982); HAW. REv. STAT. RuLE 506 (1985); IDAHO CODE § 9-203 (1990); ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 735, para. 5/8-803 (Smith-Hurd 1992); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-1-14-5
(West 1983); IowA CODE ANN. § 622.10 (West 1950); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-429 (1983);
Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 421.210 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1992); LA. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 15:477 (West 1992); ME. R. OF CT., R. OF EVID. RuLE 505 (West 1994); MD. CODE
ANN., CTS. &JuD. PROC. § 9-111 (1989); MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 233, § 20A (West
1986); MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 600.2156 (West 1986); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 595.02
(West 1988); Miss. CODE ANN. § 13-1-22 (Supp. 1994); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 491.060
(Vernon 1952); MONT. CODE ANN. § 26-1-804 (1993); NEB. REv. STAT. § 27-506 (1989);
NEv. REv. STAT. ANN. § 49.255 (Michie 1986); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 516:35 (Supp.
1994); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-23 (West 1994), amended by 1994 N.J. Laws 123; N.M.
STAT. ANN. RuLE 506 (Michie 1983); N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. § 4505 (Consol. 1978);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-53.2 (1994); N.D. CT. R. ANN. RuLE 505 (Michie 1994); OHIO REv.
CODE ANN. § 2317.02 (Anderson 1991); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2505 (West 1993);
OR. REv. STAT. § 40.260 (1993); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5943 (1982); P.R. LAws
ANN. tit. 32, RuLE 28 (1984); R.I. GEN. LAws § 9-17-23 (1985); S.C. CODE ANN. § 19-1190 (Law. Co-op. 1985); S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. § 19-13-16 (1987); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 24-1-206 (1980); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-24-8 (1992); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1607
(1973); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-400 (Michie 1992); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 5.60.060
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state, resulting in multiple interpretations and applications of the
privilege."3 Each statute, however, requires the resolution of at
least one crucial issue: to whom does the privilege apply, or, more
specifically, who holds the right of waiver?24 The determination of
whether the priest, the penitent, or both holds the privilege, similar to the determination of confidentiality of marital communications, depends upon how narrowly the court construes the scope of
the privilege. 5
Recently the New Jersey Supreme Court squarely confronted
the scope of both privileges in State v. Szemple.2 6 The Szemple court
held that the marital communications privilege does not preclude
a third party from testifying as to the contents of a written interspousal communication because third party appropriations destroy
the confidentiality. 27 The court also held that the priest was the
sole holder of the priest-penitent privilege because the statutory
(West 1963); W. VA. CODE § 48-2-10a (1995); Wisc. STAT. ANN. § 905.06 (West 1993);
§ 1-12-101 (1988).
23 Jacob M. Yellin, The History and Current Status of the Clergy-Penitent Privilege, 23
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 95, 114 (1983). Due to the differences in statutory construction
and interpretation from state to state, "there is no typical clergy privilege statute."
Mitchell, supra note 4, at 740.
24 Mayes, supra note 21, at 399. The issue of who holds the privilege for purposes
of waiver has been a source of contentious debate and confusion. Mitchell, supranote
4, at 755. Some statutes confer the privilege upon the clergyperson "in his own right."
Id. at 757. Many other statutes bestow the privilege solely upon the penitent. Id. at
756-57. Still other statutes simply treat the clergyperson as an incompetent witness
when testifying as to confidential penitent communications. Id. at 758.
When interpreting the priest-penitent privilege, courts also focus on two other
issues: 1) who qualifies as a clergyperson within the confines of the applicable statute;
and 2) was the communication confidential? Mayes, supra note 21, at 399.
25 See Mayes, supra note 21, at 399 (explaining that courts have traditionally construed the scope of priest-penitent statutes narrowly, and noting that some jurisdictions interpret the statutes more liberally). The privilege has taken different forms in
each state. Mitchell, supra note 4, at 740. For example, in states such as Oklahoma
the privilege is conferred upon the penitent; the clergyperson only has the right to
assert the privilege on behalf of the penitent. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2505
(West 1993). In states such as Louisiana and Massachusetts the clergyperson is prohibited from disclosing priest-penitent communications unless he/she obtains the
penitent's consent. See LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 15:477 (West 1992); MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 233, § 20A (West 1986). Alabama, California and Puerto Rico confer the
privilege on both the penitent and the clergyperson. See ALA. CODE § 12-21-166
(1986); CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 1030-34 (West 1966); P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 32, RULE 28
(1984). Georgia and Illinois are among a few states that, alternatively, confer the
privilege upon the clergyperson alone. See GA. CODE ANN. § 24-9-22 (1982); ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 735, para. 5/8-803 (Smith-Hurd 1992). For a discussion of the policy reasons underlying the narrow construction of privileges, see supra notes 6-7 and accompanying text.
26 135 N.J. 406, 409, 640 A.2d 817, 819 (1994).
27 Id. at 419, 420, 640 A.2d 823, 824.
Wyo. STAT.
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protection applied to the priest; thus the priest could unilaterally
waive the privilege by consenting to disclosure. 2 This holding generated immediate remedial legislation that explicitly vested the
29
priest-penitent privilege in both the priest and the penitent.
In 1991, Craig Szemple, was arrested and charged with mur30
der. After Szemple's arrest, Theresa Boyle, his wife, moved out of
their house with the help of her father, Michael Boyle."' While
sorting through his daughter's belongings, Mr. Boyle discovered a
letter to Theresa from her husband.12 Concerned about his daughter and suspicious of Szemple,"3 Mr. Boyle took the letter without
his daughter's knowledge or consent.' Mr. Boyle read the letter
several weeks after returning to his house in North Carolina.35 The
letter contained a description of a murder.3 6 Nevertheless, Mr.
Boyle failed to disclose the contents of the letter to the authorities.37 It was not until almost a year later that Mr. Boyle gave the
Id. at 433, 640 A.2d at 830.
Art Weissman, New Law Protects Confessions to Clergy From Court, ASBURY PARx
PREss, Oct. 28, 1994, at A7; see also 1994 N.J. Laws 123 (to be codified as N.J.R.E. 511,
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A app. A).
30 Szemple, 135 N.J. at 410, 411, 640 A.2d at 819. Morris County police charged
Szemple with "first-degree murder, unlawful possession of a thirty-two caliber handgun, and murder while armed with that handgun." Id. at 410, 640 A.2d at 819. Szempie had also been indicted for murder in Hudson and Warren Counties. Id.
31 Id. at 411, 640 A.2d at 819.
32 Id. The sheets of paper were in one of the boxes in which Theresa packed her
belongings. Id.
33 Mr. Boyle knew little about the defendant other than that he had recently been
arrested on a murder charge. Id.
34 Id. Mr. Boyle, in an effort to conceal the letter from his daughter, carried it
underneath his shirt out to his pickup truck and placed it in a plastic bag. Id. When
his daughter subsequently learned that he had taken the letter and given it to the
authorities, she was furious. Id. at 412, 640 A.2d. at 820. Mr. Boyle lamented that
"[my] daughter won't have nothing to do with [me] now." Id.
35 Id. at 411, 640 A.2d at 820. Mr. Boyle temporarily forgot about the letter, thus
explaining the several weeks that passed between his possession of the letter and his
actual knowledge of its contents. See id.
36 Id. The letter describing the murder read, in pertinent part:
My first hit was an act of treachery, the ultimate deceit. 4 Bullets in the
back 1 in the neck and a broken promise made at the parting of the
oncoming river. I never did tell his mother what happened to him.
The second I pulled that trigger, I became larger than death to all of my
associates.
Id. Mr. Boyle concluded that this description was "dynamite." Id. Several months
later, Mr. Boyle, upon his return to New Jersey, gave a copy of the letter to Theresa
Boyle's mother, his ex-wife. Id. at 412, 640 A.2d at 820.
37 Id. Mr. Boyle's ex-wife subsequently communicated with an attorney who informed her that because the state had already gathered significant evidence against
the defendant, it did not need the letter. Id.
28

29
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letter to the Morris County Prosecutor's Office. 38
Meanwhile, defendant remained in prison where he was periodically visited by Paul Bischoff, a Minister of Visitation." In October 1991, the defendant confessed to Bischoff that he had
committed "not one but three" murders.4 0 Bischoff, a long-time
acquaintance of defendant's family, informed defendant's sister
and brother-in-law of the confession.4 1 The Szemple family subsequently relayed this disclosure to the authorities.4 2
Szemple was indicted in Morris County for first degree murder, possession of a dangerous weapon, and murder while armed
with a dangerous weapon.4' The indictment alleged that in 1975,
the defendant shot and killed a sixteen-year-old boy, Nicholas
Miroff.4 4 At trial, after initially resting its direct case, the State

made a motion to reopen the case to present the two confessions
allegedly made by the defendant.4 5 The letter that Szemple wrote
to his wife, subsequently discovered by Mr. Boyle, constituted the
first alleged confession, while the second alleged confession consisted of what Szemple divulged to Bischoff while incarcerated.4 6
The trial court determined that the marital communications
38 Id. This action was prompted when Mr. Boyle asked Theresa how defendant's
case was proceeding and she informed him that the prosecutor planned to drop the
charges. Id. Subsequently, at trial, the state presented evidence that connected the
murder to the contents of the letter. Id.
39 Id. at 413, 640 A.2d at 820. Bischoff was a retired Newark firefighter. Id. at 412,
640 A.2d at 820. The elders of the Trinity Baptist Church in Montville had ordained
him a Minister of Visitation. Id. Prior to his ordination, Bischoff served as a Deacon
to the church. Id. Bischoffs duty as a Minister of Visitation was to visit penitentiaries
to comfort the inmates and counsel them in religious matters. Id. at 412-13, 640 A.2d
820. Acting in his official capacity as a Minister of Visitation, Bischoff visited the defendant "about nineteen times between April 1991 andJanuary 1992." Id. at 413, 640
A.2d at 820.
40 Id. It was not clear at trial if the confession to Bischoff could be linked to the
specific murder at issue. State v. Szemple, 263 N.J. Super. 98, 100-01, 622 A.2d 248, 249
(App. Div. 1993).
41 Szemple 135 N.J. at 413, 640 A.2d at 820.
42 Id. The defendant's family disclosed the confession to the prosecutor's office
with BischofFs consent. Id. at 420-21, 640 A.2d at 824.
43 Id. at 410, 640 A.2d at 819. Defendant was also charged with murder in Hudson
and Warren Counties. Id. Defendant's weapon was a .32-caliber handgun. Id.
44 Id. The victim was shot to death on July 19, 1975. Bill Riley, Szemple to Take
Stand in His Own Murder Tria4 NEWARK STAR-LEDGER, July 7, 1994, at 33. Authorities
found his remains in Mount Olive, but the body remained unidentified for 16 years.
Id.
45 Szemple 135 N.J. at 410, 640 A.2d at 819.
46 Id.; see supra notes 31-36 and accompanying text (providing the contents of the
letter and facts relating to its discovery); supra notes 39-42 and accompanying text
(discussing Bischoff's Minister of Visitation status and the facts relating to the
confession).
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privilege did not apply to the contents of the letter because a third
party unsurreptitiously obtained possession of the letter.4 7 The
trial court further concluded that Bischoff, assuming he qualified
as a clergyperson under the confines of the applicable statute,
properly waived the priest-penitent privilege without the defendant's consent.48 Accordingly, the court granted the prosecution's
motion and allowed the two confessions to be admitted into
evidence.4 9
In an interlocutory appeal, the NewJersey Superior Court, Appellate Division, reversed the denial of the motion for a mistrial,
granting leave to appeal to review the lower court's ruling regardThe appellate division affirmed
ing the evidentiary privileges.'
the trial court's decision that neither privilege applied." The appeals court approached the privileges issue from a traditional
standpoint, restricting the scope of those privileges and limiting
their preclusive effect.5 2 Accordingly, the appellate division concluded that the marital communications privilege did not apply to
defendant's letter because the privilege attaches to the communication rather than to the document.5 3 Thus, the court determined
47 Szemple, 135 N.J. at 412, 640 A.2d at 820. The court found no evidence to suggest that Mr. Boyle obtained the letter through the involvement of the defendant's
wife. Id. The trial court held a N.J. EVID. R. 8 hearing, determining that the confessions were not protected by either the marital-communications privilege or the priestpenitent privilege. Id. at 410, 640 A.2d at 819. Rule 8 provided in relevant part:
"When... the existence of a privilege is stated in these rules to be subject to a condition, and the fulfillment of the condition is in issue, that issue is to be determined by
the judge." N.J. EVID. R. 8 (renumbered as N.J.R.E. 104, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A
app. A (West 1994)). The State presented evidence connecting the content of defendant's letter to the murder. Szemple, 135 N.J. at 412, 640 A.2d at 820.
48 Id. at 420 n.2, 640 A.2d at 824 n.2. The trial court initially found that Bischoff
did not qualify as a clergyperson under the statute. Id.
49 Id. at 410, 640 A.2d at 819. Consequently, the defense filed a motion for a
mistrial. Id. at 410-11, 640 A.2d at 819. The trial court found that the new evidence
did not amount to unfair surprise and denied the defendant's motion. Id.
50 Id. at 411, 640 A.2d at 819.
51 State v. Szemple, 263 N.J. Super. 98, 99, 622 A.2d 248, 249 (App. Div. 1993).
One judge dissented, arguing that the confessions at issue were protected by the privileges. Id. at 117, 622 A.2d at 258 (Stein, J., dissenting).
52 Id. at 101, 106, 622 A.2d at 249-50, 252 (citation omitted). The appellate division noted that traditionally courts have narrowly construed privileges because they
prevent the disclosure of relevant evidence and "are obstacles in the path of the normal trial objective of a search for ultimate truth." Id. at 101, 622 A.2d at 249-50 (quoting State v. Briley, 53 N.J. 498, 506, 251 A.2d 442, 446 (1969)). Privileges, the court
proclaimed, are only accepted because they serve a stronger public interest. Id. at
101, 622 A.2d at 249. The court found that the 1992 amendment to the marital communications privilege, requiring the consent of both spouses before disclosure is allowed, signifi-cantly restricted the privilege. Id. at 103, 622 A.2d at 251.
53 Id. at 105-06, 622 A.2d at 252. The court noted that other jurisdictions deem
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that the privilege did not prohibit disclosure by a third party who
unsurreptitiously obtained the document.54 With respect to the
priest-penitent privilege, the appellate division, basing its holding
on the historical development of the privilege and the plain meaning of the statutory language, determined that the privilege belonged solely to the priest.55 Hence, the appellate division held
that neither privilege precluded disclosure of defendant's communications, and remanded the case for further proceedings.56
The New Jersey Supreme Court granted leave to appeal57 and
held that the marital communications privilege did not apply to
the privilege as attaching to the document, yet "[t]hat is not the rule in NewJersey."
Id. (citations omitted).
54 See id.("[u] nder the circumstances here, the spousal privilege does not apply to
defendant's letter.") The court found that the testimony did not support a conclusion that the letter was disclosed by the defendant's wife, but rather that Mr. Boyle
inadvertently discovered the letter. Id. at 104, 622 A.2d at 251. Thus, the court reasoned that the privilege "[did] not by its express terms apply." Id.
55 Id. at 116, 622 A.2d at 257. The appellate division did not address the issue of
whether Mr. Bischoff qualified as a clergyperson within the statutory definition because neither party raised that issue on appeal. Id. at 107 n.3, 622 A.2d at 252 n.3; see
supra notes 18-25 and accompanying text (discussing the historical development of
the priest penitent privilege and the plain meaning of the statute).
When analyzing the plain meaning of the statute, the appellate court noted that
the express language of N.J. EVID. R. 29, "does not identify the penitent as the holder
of the privilege." Szemple, 263 NJ. Super. at 107, 622 A.2d at 252 (citing N.J. EVID. R.
29, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A app. A (West 1988)). The court further opined that the
words "allowed" and "compelled" as used in the statute do not necessarily apply to the
penitent but rather may refer to the state "allowing" a priest to breach the confidentiality of the confessional. Id., 622 A.2d at 252-53; see infra note 137 for the statutory
text. Moreover, the court determined that within the context of the privilege's historical development the privilege clearly belongs to the priest. Szemple, 263 N.J. Super. at
107, 622 A.2d at 253.
The appellate court grounded the interpretation of the statutory priest-penitent
privilege on the Report of the Committee on the Revision of the Law of Evidence to the New
Jersey Supreme Courtand the Report of the Commission to Study the Improvement of the Law of
Evidence. See id. at 107-11, 622 A.2d at 253-55 (discussing the findings and reports of
the Jacobs Committee and Bigelow Commission). Considering these documents, the
court reasoned that the conclusion reached by those committees-to recommend the
adoption of the current New Jersey law as opposed to the Uniform Rule-indicated
the legislature's intent to protect the clergyperson. Id. at 107-10, 622 A.2d at 253-54.
The court further noted that the subsequently adopted legislation reflected the recommendations of the Jacobs Committee and Bigelow Commission with only one minor change relating to who qualifies as a clergyperson. Id. at 110, 622 A.2d at 254; see
infra notes 146-53 and accompanying text (discussing the committees' reports and
findings). Recognizing that the privilege as adopted included a specific reference to
waiver pursuant to NJ. EvID. R. 37, the appellate division concluded that the waiver
was only conferred upon the holder of the privilege and that the penitent was not the
holder; thus the penitent does not hold a right of waiver. Szemple, 263 NJ. Super. at
110-11, 622 A.2d at 254-55.
56 Szemple, 263 N.J. Super. at 116, 622 A.2d at 257-58.
57 State v. Szemple, 135 NJ. 406, 411, 640 A.2d 817, 819 (1994).
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the defendant's letter because possession by a third party without
the consent of the recipient destroyed the confidentiality of the
communication.5 8 The court, refusing to recognize a distinction
between oral and written communications, reasoned that New
Jersey has long accepted the principle that the marital communications privilege does not bar disclosure of communications overheard by a third party.5 9 Furthermore, the majority proffered that
it is the duty of the spouses to ensure the letter's confidentiality.6 °
The court explained that because defendant did not take the necessary precautions to ensure confidentiality, he lost the privilege. 6
With respect to the priest-penitent privilege, the court found
that the priest held the privilege because he was the party the statute intended to protect.62 The majority concluded that because
the priest was the holder of the privilege, the priest could unilaterally waive the privilege. 63 The supreme court, by narrowly construing the scope of both privileges, affirmed the judgment of the
appellate division.64
Id. at 419, 420, 640 A.2d at 823, 824.
59 Id. at 416, 417, 640 A.2d at 822; see State v. Young, 97 N.J.L. 501, 505, 117 A. 713,
715 (1922) (holding that the privilege does not apply to a letter between husband and
wife if transmitted through a third party); State v. Laudise, 86 N.J.L. 230, 231, 90 A.
1098, 1098 (1914) (citation omitted) (declaring that the marital communications
privilege does not apply to an accusation by one spouse against the other while in a
neighbor's presence); State v. Sidoti, 134 N.J. Super. 426, 430, 341 A.2d 670, 672
(App. Div. 1975) (citations omitted) (concluding the privilege does not apply to a
communication between a husband and wife overheard by a third party); State v.
Brown, 113 N.J. Super. 348, 352-53, 273 A.2d 783, 785, 786 (App. Div. 1971) (determining that the privilege did not extend to a conversation between a father and son
overheard by the mother). See infra notes 85-105 and accompanying text for further
discussion of these cases.
60 Szemple, 135 N.J. at 420, 640 A.2d at 824. Defendant never told his wife to protect the letter; consequently Theresa left the letter in a box. Id. at 419, 640 A.2d at
824.
61 Id. at 420, 640 A.2d at 824.
62 Id. at 433, 640 A.2d at 830. The court relied on the privilege's historical development, statutory language, and the committee reports relating to legislative intent.
Id.; see atso COMMITTEE ON THE REVISION OF THE LAw OF EVIDENCE, REPORT TO THE
SUPREME COURT OF N.J. 76-77 (1955) [hereinafter JACOBS COMM. REP.] (recommending that the Uniform Rule, which permits either the priest or the penitent to
claim the privilege, be rejected and that the NewJersey statute, under which the penitent has no privilege at all, be adopted as the rule); COMMISSION TO STUDY THE IMPROVEMENT OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE, REPORT 37-38 (1956) [hereinafter BIGELOW
COMM'N REP.] (recommending that the Legislature adopt the Jacobs Committee recommendation with two substantive changes: 1) that the scope be expanded to include "other confidential communication;" and 2) that the rule be subject to waiver).
See infra note 142 for a discussion of the history and statutory language of the priestpenitent privilege.
63 Szemple, 135 N.J. at 433, 640 A.2d at 830.
64 Id. at 416, 433, 640 A.2d at 822, 830.
58
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Prior to the Szemple decision, the judicial system in America
had long supported the principle that privileges should be narrowly construed because they preclude the admission of relevant
evidence. 65 For example, in State v. Briley,6 6 the New Jersey
Supreme Court declared that because strict application of privileges tends to suppress the truth, privileges are acceptable only to
the extent that they serve a greater public interest.67 The Briey
court applied this principle to the marital-testimonial privilege and
determined that a wife's testimony was not precluded by the privilege when the testimony related to a crime in which the wife was a
victim. 68 The court opined that narrowly construing the privilege
and allowing the testimony served the greater public interest.69
The United States Supreme Court in United States v. Nixon 7°

adopted a principle similar to the one set forth by the New Jersey
Supreme Court in Briley, holding that because privileges are "exceptions to the demand for every man's evidence," they should not
be expansively construed.71 In Nixon, the Court addressed the is65 See Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 234 (1960) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)
(stating that privileges should be limited because "permitting a refusal to testify or
excluding relevant evidence" frustrates the search for truth); State v. Schreiber, 122
N.J. 579, 582, 588, 585 A.2d 945, 946, 950 (1991) (holding that the effect of privileges
is clearly inhibitive and strictly limiting the physician-patient privilege to its express
terms); State v. Dyal, 97 N.J. 229, 237, 478 A.2d 390, 394 (1984) (holding that
"[b]ecause the [testimonial] privilege precludes the admission of relevant evidence,
it is restrictively construed").
66 53 N.J. 498, 251 A.2d 442 (1969).
67 Id. at 506, 251 A.2d at 446. The court explained that "[iut is the basic policy of
our law that every person is qualified and compellable to be a witness and to give
relevant and competent evidence at a trial" and that " [ p] rivileges ... are exceptions
to that policy." Id. (citations omitted). Rigid adherence to such privileges, the court
opined, is only justified when it serves a greater public interest. Id.
68 Id. at 509, 251 A.2d at 448. The police charged defendant with assaulting his
wife and murdering another person; the offenses arose from a single event and accordingly the court joined the offenses into one indictment. Id. at 501, 251 A.2d at
443. Ajury convicted the defendant of "manslaughter and atrocious assault and battery." Id. The principal basis of appeal was that defendant's wife should have been
precluded from testifying except as to facts regarding the assault upon her. Id. The
court recognized the wife as a competent witness to both crimes because spousal disqualification is eliminated in a criminal action when the wife is a victim. Id. at 509,
251 A.2d at 448.
69 See id. at 506, 251 A.2d at 446 ("Since rigid adherence to the letter of the privileges promotes the suppression of truth, they should be construed and applied in
sensible accommodation to the aim of a just result."). The court stated that, in situations such as Briey, public policy dictates that anachronistic restraints on testimony be
abandoned in favor of competent testimony. Id. at 509, 251 A.2d at 448.
70 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
71 Id. at 710 (citation omitted). The Court noted that privileges protect legitimate
interests, yet reasoned that the need to attain relevant evidence in an adversarial system of justice may sometimes outweigh those interests. Id. at 709.
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sue of an absolute presidential privilege. 72 The Court noted that
President Nixon based the claim of presidential privilege on two
grounds: first, that protection of the confidentiality of presidential
communications serves a vital need; and second, that the doctrine
of separation of powers shields the President from the application
of a judicial subpoena due to the independent nature of the Executive Branch.73 Chief Justice Burger, writing for a unanimous
court, announced that neither the need for confidentiality in presidential communications nor the doctrine of separation of powers
provided an absolute privilege.' Specifically, the Court noted that
the requirements of the judicial process outweigh even the Presidential interest in preserving absolute confidentiality. 75 The Court
emphasized that because production of relevant evidence is critical
to the function of courts, exceptions that exclude evidence should
be limited in scope.7 6 This principle of narrow construction and
72 Id. at 703. The privilege of confidentiality of Presidential communications "derive[s] from the supremacy of each branch within its own assigned area of constitutional duties." Id. at 705. The Court found that although there is no provision in the
Constitution expressly conferring a privilege upon Presidential communications, the
silence of the Constitution was not dispositive of the issue. Id. at 705-06 n.16. Rather,
the Court determined that certain privileges flow from enumerated powers and that
the Presidential privilege was one such privilege. Id. at 705-06.
73 Id. at 705, 706. The President argued that if his advisors had to fear public
dissemination of their statements, communications would not be as candid and hence
would hamper the decision-making process. Id. at 705.
74 Id. at 686, 706. President Nixon claimed that the doctrine of separation of powers supported a claim of absolute privilege because the independence of the Executive Branch "insulates a President from a judicial subpoena in an ongoing criminal
prosecution, and thereby protects confidential Presidential communications." Id. at
706. The President further argued that there was a strong need for confidentiality
between government officials and their advisors because if such confidentiality was
not guaranteed those officials and advisors would be less candid with their opinions to
the impairment of the decision-making process. Id. at 705. The Court acknowledged
the need for candor and objectivity in the decision-making process, but found that
absent a more specific justification this argument could not be accepted. Id. at 706.
The Court concluded that "generalized assertion of privilege must yield to the
demonstrated, specific need for evidence in a pending criminal trial." Id. at 713.
Refuting the President's argument that the separation of powers doctrine insulates a
President from a special subpoena due to the independent nature of the Executive
Branch, the Court based the findings on the premise that the Framers did not intend
the separate branches to operate with complete independence but rather as a cohesive system. Id. at 707.
75 Id. The Court acknowledged the fundamental need for a Presidential privilege.
Id. at 708. The Court also noted, however, that "[t]he very integrity of the judicial
system and public confidence in the system depend on full disclosure of all the facts,
within the framework of the rules of evidence." Id. at 709. Having acknowledged the
competing interests, the Court concluded that the generalized assertion of confidentiality in the case at issue did overcome the judicial system's demand of full disclosure.
Id. at 713.
76 Id. at 709, 710. The Court averred that "[t]he need to develop all relevant facts
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interpretation explicitly applies to the marital communications and
priest-penitent privileges.7 7
Prior to the decision in Nixon, the United States Supreme
Court had applied similar principles of interpretation and construction to the marital communications privilege in Wolfle v.
United States.78 The Court specifically addressed the issue of
whether the privilege extended to communications made between
husband and wife through a third party stenographer. 79 The husband dictated a letter to be sent to his wife, the contents of which
were testified to by the stenographer who took the dictation.8" The
Court strictly construed the privilege and held that the use of a
stenographer negated the confidential nature of the communication.8 ' The Wolfie Court acknowledged the assumption that
spouses generally intend their communications to be confidential,82 but after considering the nature of the communication at
in the adversary system is both fundamental and comprehensive." Id. at 709. The
integrity of the judicial system, the court opined, depends upon a compulsory process
and because privileges hinder that process they are not to be "lightly created nor
expansively construed." Id. 709, 710.
77 See 8 WIGMORE, supra note 3, § 2285, at 527-28 (stating that because privileges
frustrate the purpose of the judiciary, four narrow conditions should be met for such
a privilege to be recognized, and further acknowledging that the marital-communications privilege and priest-penitent privilege meet those criteria). See also supranote 5
for Wigmore's four conditions and relevant discussion.
78 291 U.S. 7, 11 (1934). Specifically, the Court stated that "[a]s the tendency of
the [marital communications] privilege is to prevent the full disclosure of the truth, it
should be strictly construed." Id.
79 Id. at 15. The Court maintained that the determination of that issue turned
upon whether courts employ a test that focuses on "the nature and the purpose of the
communication" or alternatively, a test that disregards the purpose and that dictates
"admissibility is purely a matter of custody," so once seized the communication is not
privileged. Id. at 7-8. The Court opined that the first test was more appropriate,
adopting the rule that "privileged communication[s] remain[ ] privileged, irrespective of custody." Id. at 8-9 (citations omitted).
80 Id. at 12. The Court did not view the stenographer in this case as a stranger to
the parties, but rather as an agent and representative. Id. at 9. The communication
to which the stenographer testified was relevant and probative of the defendant's
guilty purpose or intent. Id. at 13.
81 See id. at 17 ("The privilege . . . should be allowed only when it is plain that
marital confidence can not otherwise reasonably be preserved."). The Court analogized this communication to one made in the presence of competent children or
other family members, and thus concluded that the privilege did not protect such a
communication. Id.
82 Id. at 14; see supra note 14 (discussing the rationale underlying the
presumption).
The Supreme Court relied on this rule in Blau v. United States. 340 U.S. 332, 333
(1951). In Blau, a husband refused to disclose to a Grand Jury the whereabouts of his
wife, asserting his privilege against disclosure of confidential communications between husband and wife. Id. The Court recognized the presumption that marital
communications are confidential and privileged. Id. The Court reasoned that the
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issue, determined that knowledge of or disclosure to a third party
3
precludes the application of the privilege.1
In accordance with Wolfle, New Jersey courts have long recognized that the marital communications privilege does not preclude
disclosure of spousal communications by third parties." New
Jersey courts initially considered the issue in State v. Laudise,85 in
which the Court of Errors and Appeals rejected the application of
the marital communications privilege to an accusation by one
spouse against another while a neighbor was present. 8 6 The neighbor testified at trial about the accusation and defendant's silence
and final reply. 7 The court concluded that the presence of a third
88
party negated the confidentiality of the communication.
Within ten years of Laudise, the New Jersey Court of Errors
and Appeals, in State v. Young, 9 issued another significant opinion
regarding the scope of the marital communications privilege
communication was likely intended to be confidential because the wife knew she was
.wanted" as a witness but concealed herself so that she would not have to testify. Id. at
334. Such circumstances, the Court opined, fostered the probability that the wife
made the communication in confidence. Id. Accordingly, the Court held that the
husband properly invoked the privilege. Id.
83 Wolfle, 291 U.S. at 14. The Court reasoned that the privilege should only be
allowed when the marital confidence could not be preserved otherwise. Id. at 17.
The Court explained that the privilege protects confidential communications by encompassing every party integral to the confidentiality. Id. at 16. Although confidentiality may be an essential duty of any stenographer, the Court stated that the
preservation of marital confidences does not rely on the extension of a privilege to
such third parties. Id. at 15, 16, 17.
The Court postulated that the application of the privilege depends upon the
balancing of two countervailing presumptions. See id. at 14. The Court first identified
that privately made communications between spouses are generally presumed to be
confidential. Id. Alternatively, communications made in the presence of a third
party, the Court acknowledged, typically do not fall within the privilege because the
circumstances of such communications vitiate the presumption of confidentiality. Id.
The Court admitted, however, that certain spousal communications made in the presence of third parties may be made in confidence. Id. at 15.
84 State v. Szemple, 135 NJ. 406, 416, 640 A.2d 817, 822 (1994).
85 86 N.J.L. 230, 90 A. 1098 (1914).
86 Id. at 231, 90 A. at 1098. The court considered the defendant-husband's appeal
from a conviction for murdering his illegitimate child. Id. At trial, a neighbor testified that when the defendant's wife accused defendant of adultery and resulting paternity, the defendant remained silent. Id. The defendant's wife accused him of
fathering a child with her sister. Id. The defendant objected to the admission, contending that admittance of the neighbor's testimony in effect compelled the indirect
testimony of a wife against her husband. Id.
87

Id.

Id. The court further asserted that if the privilege precluded the testimony, the
court would not reverse the judgment because the error was harmless because it
amounted at most to a confession of paternity. Id.
89 97 NJ.L. 501, 117 A. 713 (1922).
88
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wherein.a third party overheard the communication.9" In Young, a

husband claimed that the marital communications privilege applied to a communication dictated to a third party and intended
for his wife. 1 The Court of Errors and Appeals opined that to divulge a communication to a third party vitiated the element of confidentiality, thus constructively waiving the privilege. 92 Finding
that the privilege was personal to spouses, the court concluded that
it was not error to permit a third
party witness to testify as to the
93
contents of the communication.
NewJersey courts continued to refuse extension of the marital
communications privilege to conversations not deemed confidential.9 4 In State v. Brown,9 5 the NewJersey Superior Court, Appellate
Division, refused to apply the privilege to a communication between a father and son which the mother overheard.9 6 The father
was convicted for receiving a stolen typewriter of which he admitted possession but denied knowing that it had been stolen.9 7 Defendant's wife testified that she overheard a conversation between
her husband and son in which defendant told his son that a third
party had some typewriters which defendant was to either sell or
discard.9" The court concluded that the communication did not
Id. at 505, 117 A. 715.
9' Id. at 504, 117 A. 715. While incarcerated, defendant requested that a fellow
inmate write a letter to the defendant's wife under defendant's direction and dictation. Id.
92 Id. at 505, 117 A. at 715. The court found that the determinative factor was that
the defendant confessed not to his wife but rather to a third party. Id. By analyzing
the statute, the court ascertained three elements that must be satisfied before the
privilege shall apply: 1) the communication was made "by one to the other;" 2) the
communication was made during the marriage; and 3) the communication was confidential. Id. (quotation omitted). Communication to a third party, the court avowed,
destroyed the element of confidence. Id.
93 Id. The court justified the holding by citing to a principle expressed in another
case. Id. (citing Commonwealth v. Wakelin, 120 N.E. 209, 212 (Mass. 1918) (holding
that "It]here is no rule of law that third persons who hear a private conversation
between a husband and wife shall be restrained from testifying what it was")). The
Young court asserted that the situation in the instant case was much "stronger" because the husband actually entrusted the third party with the communication, thus
warranting a similar holding. See id.
94 State v. Brown, 113 N.J. Super. 348, 352-53, 273 A.2d 783, 785 (App. Div. 1971).
95 113 N.J. Super. 348, 353, 273 A.2d 783, 786 (App. Div. 1971).
90

96 Id.

Id. at 349, 350, 273 A.2d at 784. The defendant testified that he obtained possession of the typewriter from two men he had helped with a flat tire who had typewriters in their car. Id. at 350, 273 A.2d at 784 (quotation omitted). The two men
asked the defendant to hold the typewriters until the next day, but never returned to
retrieve them. Id.
98 Id. After his wife testified, defendant was convicted of receiving a stolen typewriter. Id. at 349, 350, 273 A.2d at 784. The defendant's wife also testified as to the
97
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qualify for the privilege because it was not between husband and
wife but rather between father and son.99 Furthermore, the court
held that the defendant did not make the communication in
confidence.1 00
The New Jersey judiciary expanded upon the principle that
third parties may destroy the confidentiality of spousal communications in State v. Sidoti.1°1 The NewJersey Superior Court, Appellate
Division, held in Sidoti that the marital communications privilege
does not apply to spousal communications overheard by third parties.102 The police taped conversations between defendant and his
wife through the use of a wiretap, subsequently admitting the tapes
at trial as evidence of defendant's alleged involvement in a gambling ring.10 ' The defendant conceded that the conversations did
not include confidential communications, yet contended that admission of those conversations violated the marital communications privilege.10 4 The court noted that the communication was
not confidential, not only because it was overheard by a third party,
but also because the parties did not intend it to be confidential.10 5
The appellate division narrowly construed the privilege to preclude
communications overheard by third parties.10 6
The judiciary has also narrowly construed the priest-penitent
privilege.10 7 In Trammel v. United States,'08 the United States
state of their marriage and separation. Id. at 350, 273 A.2d at 784. The defendant
contended that it was error to admit testimony as to the conversation because the
marital communications privilege precluded such testimony. Id. at 351, 273 A.2d at
784. The defendant and his wife subsequently divorced. Id. at 350-51, 273 A.2d at
784.
99 Id. at 352-53, 273 A.2d at 785. Specifically, the court agreed with the trial court's
finding that "the communication ...was not made to her." Id.
100 Id.
101 134 N.J. Super. 426, 430, 341 A.2d 670, 672 (App. Div. 1975) (citations omitted).
102 Id. (citations omitted).
103 Id. Defendant appealed from convictions for gambling offenses. Id. at 428, 341
A.2d at 671. The court proclaimed that the police executed the wiretap "in good faith
and in compliance with the wiretap order." Id.
104 Id. at 430, 431, 341 A.2d at 672. The court noted that because the conversations
did not refer to illegal activity, the police only used the conversations to corroborate
the defendant's identity. Id.
105 Id. The court further opined that even if admission was in error, the judgment
would stand because the error was harmless. Id. at 431, 341 A.2d at 672.
106 See id. at 430, 341 A.2d at 672 ("It is generally held that a third person overhearing a confidential communication between a husband and wife may testify as to it.").
107 William A. Cole, Religious Confidentiality and the Reportingof Child Abuse: A Statutory and ConstitutionalAnalysis, 21 CoLu. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 1, 23 (1987). Dean Wigmore noted that courts, in interpreting the statutes, have restricted the privilege:
to communications made in the understood pursuance of that church
discipline which gives rise to the confessional relation, and, therefore,
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Supreme Court noted the importance of the testimonial privilege,
but coupled this recognition with the pronouncement that such
privileges should be narrowly construed so as not to exclude probative evidence.1"' The Court stated that the priest-penitent privilege
limits protection to private communications because such a privilege recognizes the need to disclose flawed acts and thoughts to
spiritual counselors in total confidence.110
The New Jersey Supreme Court first attempted to analyze the
scope of the statutory priest-penitent privilege with In re Murtha.1 1 '
The Murtha court rejected a nun's contention that the priest-peniin particular to confessions of sin only, not to communications of other
tenor; that it includes only the communications, and not information
otherwise acquired; and that it exempts the penitent also, as well as the
priest, from disclosure.
8 WIGMORE, supra note 3, § 2395, at 876-77 (footnotes omitted).
108 445 U.S. 40 (1980).
109 Id. at 50-51. The Trammel Court did not consider the priest-penitent privilege
explicitly, but rather the privilege against spousal testimony. Id. at 51. The Court
illustrated the principle that the legislature did not intend testimonial privileges in
general to sweep broadly but rather expected that they be narrowly construed, noting
the judicially accepted scope of other privileges such as the priest-penitent and attorney-client privilege. Id. at 50, 51. The Court indicated that those privileges were
"rooted in the imperative need for confidence and trust." Id. at 51. With regard to
the priest-penitent privilege, the Court submitted that the "privilege recognizes the
human need to disclose to a spiritual counselor, in total and absolute confidence,
what are believed to be flawed acts or thoughts and to receive priestly consolation and
guidance in return." Id. The Court distinguished the spousal testimonial privilege
from privileges such as the priest-penitent by noting that as compared to the spousal
privilege, "[n]o other testimonial privilege sweeps so broadly." Id. Accordingly, the
Court concluded that the spousal privilege against adverse testimony frustrated justice
and was hence inapplicable to the case at bar. Id. at 53.
110 Id. at 51.
111 115 N.J. Super. 380, 386, 279 A.2d 889, 892 (App. Div. 1971), certif. denied, 59
N.J. 239, 281 A.2d 278 (1971). The Murtha court addressed the priest-penitent privilege by applying the principles developed in State v. Briley. Id.; see supra notes 66-69
and accompanying text (discussing the NewJersey Supreme Court's treatment of testimonial privileges in State v. Briley). The court previously confronted the issue of the
priest-penitent privilege in State v. Morehous, but did not make a finding as to the
scope of that privilege because, at the time, no statute in New Jersey created or acknowledged such a privilege and the common law provided no basis for the privilege.
97 NJ.L. 285, 295, 117 A. 296, 300 (1922). In Morehous, a man accused of murder
sought to prevent a statement he made to his spiritual advisor from being admitted
into evidence. Id. The court concluded that even if this spiritual advisor qualified as
a clergyman, the privilege could not apply because it had no foundation in the law.
Id.
NewJersey finally recognized the privilege by statute in 1947, stating in relevant
part:
A clergyman, or other minister of any religion, shall not be allowed or
compelled to disclose in any court, or to any public officer, a confession
made to him in his professional character, or as a spiritual advisor, or as
a spiritual advisor in the course of discipline enjoined by the rules or
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tent privilege justified her refusal to answer questions before a
Grand Jury. 1 2 In concluding that the nun, Sister Margaret Murtha, did not qualify as a clergyperson under the dictates of the statute, the appellate division examined the scope of the priestpenitent privilege."1 The court noted that the privilege explicitly
applied only to a clergyman, minister, or other person or practitioner authorized to perform similar functions. 114 The appellate
division posited that Sister Margaret did not conduct any religious
functions and thus did not qualify under the statute." 5 In reaching this conclusion, the appellate division relied on the Briley principle that because strict adherence to privilege frustrates the search
for truth, privileges instead should be construed narrowly to
1 16
achieve a just result.

With this judicial history in mind, the New Jersey Supreme
Court once again confronted the issue of construction and interpractice of the religious body to which he belongs or of the religion
which he professes.
1947 N.J. Laws 324.
112 Murtha, 115 NJ. Super. at 382, 387, 279 A.2d at 890, 893. The nun, Sister Margaret, appeared before a Grand Jury pursuant to a subpoena. Id. at 381, 279 A.2d at
890. The Grand Jury was investigating an alleged homicide and required the testimony of Sister Margaret because she had conversed with the accused suspect. Id. As
a result of her refusal to answer the questions, the court held Sister Margaret in contempt. Id., 279 A.2d at 889.
113 Id. at 385, 386, 279 A.2d at 892. The court determined the scope of the privilege on the basis of N.J. EviD. R. 29, which conferred the privilege. Id.; see infra note
137 (providing the statutory language of N.J. EvID. R. 29). The New Jersey Rules of
Evidence have been renumbered, with occasional deviations, to correspond with the
FederalRules of Evidence. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A app. A, at 83, 86-89 (West 1994)
(providing the reasoning behind and details of the alterations). For future reference,
N.J. EvIo. R. 28 is now N.J.R.E. 509 and N.J. EVID. R. 29 is now N.J.R.E. 511. N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 2A:84A supp. A, at 87. State v. Szemple began before the renumbering and the
court used the previous numbering system in the opinion. For sake of continuity, this
Note will use the old numbering as well.
114 Murtha, 115 N.J. Super. at 386, 279 A.2d at 892 (quoting N.J. EvID. R_ 29). The
court further noted that neither the court nor counsel for the parties could find textual or decisional authority to support Sister Margaret's assertion that she was protected by the priest-penitent privilege. Id. at 387, 279 A.2d at 893.
115 Id. at 386, 279 A.2d at 892. The court found that Sister Margaret neither heard
confession nor performed absolution functions generally performed by priests or clergyman. Id. Furthermore, the court noted that Sister Margaret's church superiors
urged her to testify, evidencing their belief that no such privilege barred her from
doing so. Id. at 387, 279 A.2d at 893.
116 Id. at 385-86, 279 A.2d at 892; see supra notes 66-69 and accompanying text (discussing State v. Briley). The principle as set forth in Briley stated, "[slince rigid adherence to the letter of the privileges promotes the suppression of truth, they should be
construed and applied in sensible accommodation to the aim of ajust result." State v.
Briley, 53 NJ. 498, 506, 251 A.2d 442, 446 (1969).
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pretation of evidentiary privileges in State v. Szemple. 11" The court
specifically addressed the scope of the marital communications
privilege and the priest-penitent privilege.118 Justice Garibaldi,
writing for the majority, began by establishing the general principle that privileges should be narrowly construed because they contravene the search for truth.1 19
Justice Garibaldi first focused on the marital communications
privilege.12 ° The justice proclaimed that the privilege, as set forth
in N.J. Evid. P,. 28,121 precludes the disclosure of spousal communications made in confidence during the marriage except in distinct
situations.1 22 The court noted that subsequent to the trial the legis117

135 N.J. 406, 409, 640 A.2d 817, 819 (1994).

118

Id.

119 Id. at 413, 640 A.2d at 820. Setting the foundation for the court's analysis, the
justice reviewed well established principles of testimonial privileges. Id. The court
began by citing to previous decisions of the New Jersey courts as well as the United
States Supreme Court, all of which held that because evidentiary privileges preclude
the admission of probative evidence, they should be construed restrictively. Id. at 41314, 640 A.2d 820-21 (citing United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710 (1974) (noting
that as a general proposition privileges are to be narrowly construed); Trammel v.
United States, 445 U.S. 40, 50 (1980) (declaring that because privileges contravene
the fundamental search for truth by frustrating the public's right "to every man's
evidence," they must be narrowly construed); State v. Schreiber, 122 N.J. 579, 582-83,
585 A.2d 945, 946 (1991) (holding that privileges are inhibitive in effect and thus
must be narrowly construed); State v. Briley, 53 N.J. 498, 506, 251 A.2d 442, 446
(1969) (concluding that testimonial privileges should be restrictively construed because they preclude the admission of relevant evidence); State v. Bodtmann, 248 N.J.
Super. 100, 101, 590 A.2d 259, 260 (Law Div. 1990) (stating that because privileges
"obstruct[ ] the search for truth, [they] must be construed restrictively")).
120 Id. at 414, 640 A.2d at 821. The specific issue was whether appropriation by a
third party destroys the confidentiality of a written interspousal communication. See
id. at 416, 640 A.2d at 822.
121 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-22 (West Supp. 1994) [hereinafter N.J. EvD. R. 28].
N.J. EviD. R. 28 provides in relevant part:
No person shall disclose any communication made in confidence between such person and his or her spouse unless both shall consent to
the disclosure or unless the communication is relevant to an issue in an
action between them or in a criminal action or proceeding in which
either spouse consents to the disclosure, or in a criminal action proceeding coming within Rule 23(2). When a spouse is incompetent or
deceased, consent to the disclosure may be given for such spouse by the
guardian, executor or administrator. The requirement for consent
shall not terminate with divorce or separation. A communication between spouses while living separate and apart under a divorce from bed
and board shall not be a privileged communication.
Id. (footnote omitted).
122 Szemple, 135 N.J. at 414, 640 A.2d at 821. The privilege does not apply to interspousal communications relating to business matters nor to communications to which
third parties are privy, as it is assumed that in those distinct situations confidentiality
was not intended. DePrez, supra note 14, at 128, 129.
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lature had amended the Rule.1 23 The court contended that
although the amendment was not applicable to the instant casebecause defendant's wife did not consent to the disclosure-the
of the legislature's inamendment nonetheless was demonstrative
124
tent to limit the scope of the privilege.
The court next averred that the legislature had long recognized the marital communications privilege because public policy
supports unfettered communications between spouses to foster the
inviolability of marriage. 125 The court noted, however, that strong
public policy considerations do not abrogate the judicial principle
of restrictively construing privileges, including the marital communications privilege. 126 Expanding upon this principle, Justice Garibaldi declared that because courts must narrowly construe the
privilege, it does not apply to written interspousal communications
27
obtained by a third party absent the recipient spouse's consent.1
The majority expounded that although New Jersey courts had
never specifically held that the privilege does not preclude the admission of a written interspousal communication acquired by a
third party, the state judiciary had held that orally transmitted com123 Id. (quotation omitted). At the time of defendant's trial, N.J. EVID. R. 28 provided in relevant part that "[n]o person shall disclose any communication made in
confidence between such person and his or her spouse unless both shall consent to
the disclosure." N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-22 (West 1976), amended by 1992 N.J. Laws
142. The legislature amended this version by providing that either spouse may unilaterally consent to disclosure. See N.J. EVID. R. 28; see also supranote 121 (providing the
current statutory language of N.J. EvID. R. 28).
124 Szemple, 135 N.J. at 414, 640 A.2d at 821. The justice averred that the amendment considerably relaxed the privilege by permitting a marital communication to be
disclosed in a criminal proceeding when either spouse assents to the disclosure rather
than requiring the consent of both spouses. Id.
The amendment conforms the New Jersey spousal privilege to the federal rule.
ASSEMBLYJUDICIARY, LAW AND PUBLIC SAFETY COMM., COMM. STATEMENT No. 1055, at 1
(1992). The amendment allows either spouse to waive the privilege by consenting to
the disclosure of marital communications. Id.
125 Szemple, 135 N.J. at 414-15, 640 A.2d at 821 (citing Blau v. United States, 340 U.S.
332, 333 (1951); Wolfle v. United States, 291 U.S. 7, 14 (1934); Rozycki v. Peley, 199
NJ. Super. 571, 579, 489 A.2d 1272, 1276 (Law Div. 1984); State v. Young, 97 N.J.L.
501, 505, 117 A. 713, 715 (1922); 8 WiGMoRE, supra note 3, § 2332, at 642).
supra note 14, § 82, at 303
126 Id. at 415, 640 A.2d at 821 (quoting 1 McCoRMiCKi,
(stating that because "the [marital communications] privilege has as its only effect the
suppression of relevant evidence, its scope should be confined as narrowly as is consistent with reasonable protection of marital communications")).
127 Id. (quoting 8 WIGMORE, supra note 3, § 2339, at 668 (asserting the general
proposition that if written communications "were obtained surreptitiously or otherwise without the addressee's consent, the privilege should cease")). The court explained that in comporting with the goal of narrowly construing privileges, the
majority of jurisdictions do not extend the privilege to written communications that
come into the possession of a third party. Id. at 416, 640 A.2d at 822.
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munications are admissible when overheard by a third party. 12 1
Examining the case at bar in the context of prior New Jersey
case law, Justice Garibaldi concluded that as a general principle the
involvement of a third party destroys the confidential nature of the
communication." The justice explained that the privilege is personal to spouses and does not adhere to the communication itself.' ° The majority found no important distinction between a
written and oral communication and, accordingly, concluded that
third party involvement vitiates the confidential nature3 1of a written
communication just as readily as it does an oral one.1
Id. The court examined four prior cases that refused to extend the marital communications-privilege to oral communications overheard by third parties. Id. at 41617, 640 A.2d at 822 (citing State v. Young, 97 N.J.L. 501, 505, 117 A. 713, 715 (1922);
State v. Laudise, 86 N.J.L. 230, 231, 90 A. 1098, 1098 (1914); State v. Sidoti, 134 N.J.
Super. 426, 430, 341 A.2d 670, 672 (App. Div. 1975); State v. Brown, 113 N.J. Super.
348, 353, 273 A.2d 783, 785 (App. Div. 1971)); see supra notes 85-105 and accompanying text (discussing in depth the four cases relied upon by the New Jersey Supreme
Court).
129 Szemple, 135 N.J. at 417, 640 A.2d at 822.
130 Id.
131 Id. Thejustice rationalized this conclusion by noting two cases from other jurisdictions, both of which adopted this position. Id. at 417-18, 640 A.2d at 822-23 (citing
State v. Myers, 640 P.2d 1245, 1248 (Kan. 1982); Zimmerman v. State, 750 S.W.2d 194,
200 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988) (en banc)). Zimmerman and Myers, the court explained,
both confronted the issue of whether the marital communications privilege extended
to written interspousal communications obtained by a third party and held that such
communications were not privileged. Id. at 417, 418, 640 A.2d at 823.
In Zimmerman v. State, a letter sent by defendant to his wife was found by his wife's
mother in a dresser drawer while she was admittedly looking for evidence of defendant's guilt. 750 S.W.2d at 197. The defendant's mother-in-law subsequently read the
letter without the consent of the defendant's wife. Id. Although the letter was a communication between spouses, the Texas court recognized certain exceptions to the
rule that spousal communications are absolutely privileged. Id. at 199. One such
exception, the court noted, were communications overheard by third parties because
such communications have lost their confidential character. Id. (citations omitted).
The court acknowledged the analogy between oral and written communications and
accordingly concluded that written communications obtained by third parties are no
more privileged than oral communications overheard by third parties. Id. (quotation
omitted). Consequently, the Zimmerman court held that the letter containing the confession was not a privileged marital communication because it came into the possession of a third party without the collusion of the recipient spouse and hence lost its
confidential character. Id. at 200. (quotation omitted). The primary authority the
Zimmerman court used in support of that conclusion was the rule set forth by the
Kansas Supreme Court in State v. Myers. Id. (citation omitted).
In State v. Myers, the resident of a house discovered a written interspousal communication under a mattress three months after the defendant's wife vacated the
premises. 640 P.2d at 1246. The Kansas Supreme Court discerned that the following
rule was to be followed: when a written spousal communication is discovered "inadvertently and without the consent or connivance of the addressee-spouse," the third
party's testimony as to the contents of that communication should be admissible. Id.
at 1248. The Myers court determined that public policy would be better served by
128
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Having established the principle that the marital communications privilege is lost when a third party obtains the communication, the court next addressed the defendant's assertion that this
principle is only true if the third party inadvertently discovered the
communication. 132 The court stated that the purpose of the inadvertency requirement was to prevent a spouse from unilaterally de13 3
feating the privilege through connivance with a third party.

Moreover, the court noted that the recent amendment to N.J.Evid.

R 28, which permitted the disclosure of a marital communication
with the consent of only one spouse, renders the inadvertency requirement unnecessary because the spouse can simply disclose the
communication directly to the court. 134 Furthermore, the court

proclaimed that because the parties failed to take the necessary
precautions to ensure the confidentiality of the letter, they lost the
benefit of the privilege.1 35 The court thus held that the trial court

properly admitted the letter because the privilege did not
apply to
13 6

the written communication obtained by a third party
Turning to the priest-penitent privilege, the court noted that
admitting the communication into evidence to ascertain the truth. Id. In conclusion,
the court stressed that the rule set forth was "entirely consistent" with the almost universally accepted rule that oral statements between spouses lose their confidential nature and hence, privileged status, when overheard by a third party. Id. at 1249.
132 Szemple, 135 N.J. at 418-19, 640 A.2d at 823. The court acknowledged Judge
Stein's adoption of that qualification in his appellate division dissent, but found that
both Judge Stein and the defendant had applied the inadvertency requirement to the
incorrect party. Id. at 419, 640 A.2d at 823.
133 Id. The inadvertency requirement, the court opined, referred to the recipient
spouse. Id. The court thus found the lower court's dissent, which stated that the
privilege would apply as long as the third party intentionally obtains the communication, even if a spouse intended disclosure, to be both misplaced and unnecessary. Id.
at 418-19, 640 A.2d at 823.
134 Id. at 419, 640 A.2d at 823; see also supra note 121 (providing the text of N.J.
EvID. R 28). The court also noted that the theory advanced by the dissent below was
based upon the unsubstantiated assertion that the third party "surreptitiously appropriated" the written communication. Szemple 135 N.J. at 420, 640 A.2d at 824 (citation omitted). Justice Garibaldi refuted this assertion by indicating that although the
concealment of the letter was deliberate, the actual discovery was unintentional. Id.
The court also found no evidence to suggest that the recipient spouse, defendant's
wife, had orchestrated the discovery. Id. at 419, 640 A.2d at 823-24.
135 Id. at 419, 420, 640 A.2d at 824. Justice Garibaldi proffered that the risk of a
third party obtaining a written communication is foreseeable and thus, the parties are
responsible to guard against this eventuality. Id. at 419-20, 640 A.2d at 824. The court
opined that the defendant's failure to ask his wife to either destroy or conceal the
letter and his wife's apathy in leaving the letter in a box illustrated the parties' failure
to take the necessary precautions. Id. at 419, 640 A.2d at 824.
136 Id. at 420, 640 A.2d at 824. The court concurred with the lower courts that third
party appropriation destroys the confidentiality of spousal communications. Id. at
419, 640 A.2d at 823.
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under N.J. Evid. R 37,137 the holder of a testimonial privilege may
waive that privilege by consenting to the disclosure of the confidential communication.13 8 Justice Garibaldi postulated that although
Bischoff undoubtedly consented to the disclosure, the crucial issue
was whether the priest may unilaterally waive the privilege.' 9 The
majority determined that the plain language of the statute was ambiguous,1 4 0 requiring the court to construe the statute in such a
137 NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-29 (West 1976) [hereinafter NJ. Evmn. R. 37]. NJ.
EvID. R. 37 is a waiver statute that provides in pertinent part:
A person waives his right or privilege to refuse to disclose or to
prevent another from disclosing a specified matter if he or any other
person while the holder thereof has (a) contracted with anyone not to
claim the right or privilege or, (b) without coercion and with knowledge of his right or privilege, made disclosure of any part of the privileged matter or consented to such a disclosure made by anyone.
A disclosure which is itself privileged or otherwise protected by the
common law, statutes or rules of court of this State, or by lawful contract, shall not constitute a wavier under this section. The failure of a
witness to claim a right or privilege with respect to [one] question shall
not operate as a waiver with respect to any other question.
Id.
138 Szemple, 135 NJ. at 420, 640 A.2d at 824. The court noted that the holder may
also waive the testimonial privilege by simply disclosing the communication. Id.
The priest-penitent privilege as codified in New Jersey provides that:
Subject to Rule 37, a clergyman, minister or other person or practitioner authorized to perform similar functions, of any religion shall not
be allowed or compelled to disclose a confession or other confidential
communication made to him in his professional character, or as a spiritual advisor in the course of the discipline or practice of the religious
body to which he belongs or of the religion which he professes, nor
shall he be compelled to disclose the confidential relations and communications between and among him and individuals, couples, families or
groups with respect to the exercise of his professional counseling role.
NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-23 (West 1976) (footnote omitted) [hereinafter NJ. EvID. R.
29).
139 Szemple, 135 N.J. at 420-21, 640 A.2d at 824. Simply stated, the court questioned
who holds the priest-penitent privilege for the purpose of waiver. Id. at 421, 640 A.2d
at 824. The court noted that a determination of this issue first required consideration
of the plain language of the statute. Id. (citing Town of Morristown v. Woman's Club,
124 N.J. 605, 610, 592 A.2d 216, 219 (1991) (stating construction of any statute necessarily begins with consideration of its plain language); Kimmelman v. Henkels & McCoy, Inc., 108 N.J. 123, 128, 527 A.2d 1368, 1371 (1987) (same)). Justice Garibaldi
assessed that although the language of N.J. Evm. R. 29 excludes specific mention of
which party holds the privilege, the language does direct the privilege toward the
clergyperson "who shall not be allowed or compelled to disclose a confidential communication." Id., 640 A.2d at 824-25.
140 Id. at 422, 640 A.2d at 825. The court addressed defendant's contention that
the phrase "shall not be allowed... to disclose" (alteration in original) evidences that
the penitent's consent is also required for a valid waiver because the phrase alludes to
the penitent "allowing" the cleric to disclose. Id. at 421-22, 640 A.2d at 824-25. The
majority determined that the statute was ambiguous on this point because the appellate division determined that the same phrase had a different meaning in that it re-
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way as to best effectuate the legislative intent. 1 4 1 Based on the legislative history of the priest-penitent privilege, coupled with the privilege's origin in the Seal of Confession, 14 2 the court opined that N.J.
ferred to either the State or the Court-not the penitent-allowing the clergyperson
to disclose the communication. Id., 640 A.2d at 825.
141 Id. at 422, 640 A.2d at 825 (citing Cedar Cove, Inc. v. Stanzione, 122 N.J. 202,
213, 584 A.2d 784, 789 (1991) (stating that when a statute is ambiguous a court must
construe the statute in a way that will best effectuate the legislature's intent); Accountemps v. Birch Tree Group, Ltd., 115 N.J. 614, 622, 560 A.2d 663, 667 (1989)
(holding same)). Noting the validity of the legal principle that a court shall avoid a
construction which renders a portion of a statute meaningless, the Szemple court stated
that effectuating the intention of the legislature was the controlling principle when
construing a statute. Id. (citations omitted). While clarifying statutory ambiguity, the
court observed that in determining the intent of the legislature, the judiciary may rely
on extrinsic aids such as legislative history. Id. (citations omitted). The legislative
history, the court announced, includes, among other things, "the reports of special
committees or commissions appointed to study and suggest legislation." Id. (citation
omitted).
142 Id. at 422, 423, 640 A.2d at 825. Justice Garibaldi related that under the Code of
Canon Law of the Roman Catholic Church, betrayal by a confessor of a penitent was a
severely penalized crime which often resulted in an automatic excommunication. Id.
at 423, 640 A.2d at 825 (citation omitted). The court further reported that English
courts acknowledged the sanctity of the confessional until the English Reformation,
when malevolence toward the Catholic Church resulted in nonrecognition of the
privilege. Id., 640 A.2d at 825-26. (citations omitted). Therefore, the court posited,
the privilege was not recognized in American common law and as a result, clergypersons were compelled to testify unless the privilege had been conferred by statute. Id.
at 423-24, 640 A.2d at 826. (citations omitted).
Justice Garibaldi noted that the tradition of the sanctity of the confessional endured not only in the Roman Catholic Church, but also in many other Christian denominations. See id. at 424, 640 A.2d at 826 (listing the testimonial traditions of the
Episcopal Church, American Lutheran Church, Presbyterian Church in the United
States, United Presbyterian Church, and American Baptist Convention). Accordingly,
the court observed, various religious groups confronted with a potential choice between imprisonment or a breach of religious duty began to pressure legislatures to
create a privilege. Id. Hence, the court charged, the Legislature enacted the privilege not with the purpose of protecting the penitent, but rather with the purpose of
protecting the clergyperson from forced disclosure of spiritual confidences. Id. (citation omitted).
Justice Garibaldi recounted that consequently almost all states now statutorily
recognize the priest-penitent privilege. Id. NewJersey, the court noted, first statutorily recognized the privilege in 1947. Id. (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:81-9 (1952), repealed by 1960 N.J. Laws 52). N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:81-9 provided in relevant part:
A clergyman, or other minister of any religion, shall not be allowed
or compelled to disclose in any court, or to any public officer, a confession made to him in his professional character, or as a spiritual advisor,
or as a spiritual advisor in the course of discipline enjoined by the rules
or practice of the religious body to which he belongs or of the religion
which he professes.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:81-9 (West 1952). The Szemple court noted that like its modem
successor, the original NewJersey statute failed to specify the holder of the privilege.
Szemple, 135 N.J. 425, 640 A.2d at 826.

1995]

NOTE

1617

1 43
Evid. R. 29 confers the privilege solely upon the clergyperson
Therefore, the court determined that the clergyperson may elect
to waive the privilege without the penitent's consent. 1"
In reciting the legislative history of the priest-penitent privilege, Justice Garibaldi noted that because the legislature originally
enacted the privilege under a subsection regarding the competency of witnesses and failed to include a waiver provision, courts
could interpret the privilege as merely a rule of competency and
not a privilege.1 45 The majority suggested that the rule read not as
a waivable privilege, but rather "as an absolute ban on disclosure." 146 Ultimately, however, the court rejected this contention,
proclaiming that the recommendations of the two committees appointed to study New Jersey's evidentiary rules demonstrated that
the legislature intended the statute to confer a privilege, not
147
merely state a rule of competency.
The justice recounted that in the 1950s, the court appointed
the Committee on the Revision of the Law of Evidence (]acobs
Committee), to study the NewJersey Evidentiary Statutes and issue
a report making recommendations regarding whether to adopt the
Uniform Rules of Evidence. 148 The Jacobs Committee, the justice

Szemple, 135 N.J. at 422-23, 640 A.2d at 825.
Id. at 423, 640 A.2d at 825. The court explained that the clergyperson's waiver
does not require the penitent's consent. Id. The majority also noted that the only
limitation to this waiver rule lies in the clergyperson's own religious tenets. Id. The
court concluded that this interpretation most accurately reflected the Legislature's
intent. Id.
145 Id. at 425, 640 A.2d at 826.
146 Id. (citation omitted).
147 Id., 640 A.2d at 826-27. The court relied primarily on the findings of the Jacobs
and Bigelow Committees to support the holding in this case. Id. at 425-30, 640 A.2d at
826-29.
148 Id. at 425, 640 A.2d at 827. The court noted that the Jacobs Committee report,
issued in 1955, compared the Uniform Rules of Evidence, which had met with wide
acceptance, with the New Jersey Evidentiary Statutes. Id. (citation omitted). The
court provided the text of the Uniform Rule and quoted the Drafter's comment to
that rule, which stated that the "rule permits either priest, broadly defined, or penitent to claim the privilege." Id. at 425-26, A.2d at 827 (quoting JACOBS COMM. REP.,
supra note 62, at 76).
The Uniform Rule provided in relevant part:
A person, whether or not a party, has a privilege to refuse to disclose,
and to prevent a witness from disclosing a communication if he claims
the privilege and the judge finds that (a) the communication was a
penitential communication and (b) the witness is the penitent or the
priest, and (c) the claimant is the penitent, or the priest making the
claim on behalf of an absent penitent.
UNIF. R. EVID. 29(2), reprinted in CALIFORNIA LAW REVISION COMMISSION, TENTATIVE
RECOMMENDATION AND A STUDY RELATING TO THE UNIFORM RuLEs OF EVIDENCE 453
(1964) (superseded by UNIF. R_ Evm. 505).
143
144
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explained, subsequently advised the legislature to adopt N.J. Stat.
Ann. § 2A:81-9 as the rule rather than the Uniform Rule. 4 9 The
court reasoned that theJacobs Committee preferred the statute because it most effectively protected the clergyperson from compelled disclosure by conferring the privilege exclusively upon the
cleric.15 ° On the basis of the Jacobs Committee Report, the court
related, the legislature retained N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:81-9.1 51
The court then recounted the legislature's appointment of the
Commission to Study the Improvement of the Law of Evidence
(Bigelow Commission)."52 The court stated that the Bigelow Commission Report, issued in 1956, essentially adopted the recommendations made by the Jacobs Committee, but proposed two changes
to N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:81-9: expanding the scope of the privilege
beyond confessions and including a waiver provision. 5 Relying
149 Szemple, 135 NJ. at 426, 640 A.2d at 827. In its annotation the Jacobs Committee
made the following pertinent comments:
4. Comparison between NewJersey Statute and Uniform Rule. Under the
rule the privilege belongs to the penitent, and he can waive it by a partial disclosure to any one, or waive it in other ways, thereby compelling
the priest to testify. The statute seems preferable.
5. Under the rule the penitent has a privilege to refuse to disclose
his confession whereas under the statute he has no privilege at all.
Although the rule is better here, such disclosures almost always would
be hearsay and therefore the matter is not important.
JAcoBs COMM. REP., supra note 62, at 77. The Committee found that although the
Uniform Rule is superior in that it bestows the privilege, the statute is ultimately preferable because it does not compel the priest to testify if the penitent discloses the
communication. Id. Furthermore, the committee found that any disclosures under
the Uniform Rule would almost always be hearsay and thus inadmissible anyway. Id.
150 Szemple, 135 N.J. at 426-27, 640 A.2d at 827. Relying on the decision of the appellate division, the court noted that this apprehension may have arisen from a desire
to either prevent the penitent from manipulating the privilege or simply to protect
the cleric's free exercise of religion. Id. at 426, 640 A.2d at 827 (citing State v. Szempie, 263 NJ. Super. 98, 110-11 n.5, 622 A.2d 248, 254-55 n.5 (1993)). Justice Garibaldi again noted the Jacob Committee's preference for the statutory language of N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2A:81-9, which on its face granted "no privilege at all" to the penitent as
opposed to the language of the Uniform Rule which did grant a waivable privilege to
the penitent. Id. at 426-27, 640 A.2d at 827 (quotingJACOBS COMM. REP., supra note
62, at 77). The court maintained that construing the statute so as to confer the privilege upon the clergyperson alone answers theJacobs Committee's concerns because if
the privilege does not attach to the penitent, he or she cannot consequently waive the
privilege and compel the clergyperson to disclose the communication. Id. at 427, 640
A.2d at 827-28.
151 Id., 640 A.2d at 828. See supra note 141 for the appropriate text of the statute.
152 Szemple, 135 N.J. at 427, 640 A.2d at 828. The legislature appointed the Bigelow
Commission pursuant to ajoint resolution. BIGELOW COMM'N REP., supra note 62, at
1.
153 Szemple, 135 NJ. at 427, 640 A.2d at 828 (citing BIGELOW COMM'N REP., supra
note 62, at 38). The Bigelow Commission, the justice proffered, explained that other
communications that would not qualify as confessions should also be pfivileged. Id. at
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extensively on the Jacobs and Bigelow Committee Reports, as well
as on the express language of the statute and the privilege's origin,
the court found that the cleric is the only party authorized to waive
the privilege."'
Turning to Szemple's contention that the statutory construc427-28, 640 A.2d at 828 (quoting BIGELOW COMM'N REP., supra note 62, at 38). The
court opined that that explanation coupled with the inclusion of a wavier provision
illustrated the Bigelow Commission's view that N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:81-9 created a
waivable privilege rather than a rule of competency. Id. at 428, 640 A.2d at 828.
Thus, the court explained, the rule does not act as an unequivocal ban on disclosure.
Id.
The court next rejected the claim by the Commentator to the New Jersey Rules of
Evidence that the Bigelow Commission erred in including a waiver provision because it
contradicts the purpose of rule that a religious figure should never be considered as a
source of this type of evidence. Id. (quotation omitted). Justice Garibaldi conceded
that the Bigelow Commission may have misunderstood the purpose of the rule, but
stated that one could not ignore the fact that the legislation later adopted contained
an explicit reference to waiver pursuant to NJ. EvID. R. 37. Id. Nevertheless, the
court submitted that the mere inclusion of a waiver provision did not solve the problem of who may waive the privilege. Id. The court then addressed the language of the
statute, which is directed toward the cleric yet silent as to who holds the privilege. Id.
The court found this inexact language to be determinative, particularly because other
evidentiary privileges make explicit mention of who holds the privilege. Id. at 428-29,
640 A.2d at 828 (citations omitted). Moreover, the court asserted, other evidentiary
privileges identify the confider as the holder of the privilege because there is less
opportunity for such confiders to exploit the privilege and because no conflicting
religious duty inheres in those privileges which would force one party to maintain
confidentiality despite the holder's willingness to permit disclosure. Id. at 429, 640
A.2d at 828-29. (quoting Yellin, supra note 23, at 137).
154 Id. at 429, 640 A.2d at 829. The court further supported this conclusion by
noting that the language of the statute was directed toward the clergyperson and that
theJacobs Committee was concerned with the cleric when it evaluated the legislation.
Id. (citation omitted). For textual support for this principle, the Szemple court turned
to In re Murtha, an appellate division case involving the priest-penitent privilege. Id.
(citing In re Murtha, 115 NJ. Super. 380, 384, 279 A.2d 889, 891 (App. Div. 1971)); see
supra notes 110-15 and accompanying text (providing an analysis of Murtha). The
court posited that although the Murtha court held that a nun was not a clergyperson
under the statute, without reaching the issue of who held the privilege, the Murtha
court suggested in dicta that even if the nun did fall within the statute, the privilege
did not apply because the nun had effectively waived the privilege. Szemple, 135 NJ. at
429-30, 640 A.2d at 829 (citing Murtha, 115 NJ. Super. at 387-88, 279 A.2d at 893).
Thus, Justice Garibaldi implied that the dicta in Murtha clearly indicated that the
clergyperson holds the priest-penitent privilege and thus may waive the privilege without the penitent's consent. Id. at 430, 640 A.2d at 829.
Next, the court reported that a 1981 amendment to the priest-penitent privilege
did not identify the holder of the privilege but merely expanded the privilege's scope.
Id. (quotation omitted). The court assessed that the legislature's failure to amend the
statute in this regard amounted to an agreement with the dicta expressed in the Murtha decision that the clergyperson unilaterally holds the priest-penitent privilege. Id.
(citations omitted). The 1981 amendment added the following language to NJ. EVID.
R. 29: "nor shall he be compelled to disclose the confidential relations and communications between and among him and individuals, couples, families or groups with
respect to the exercise of his professional counseling role." 1981 NJ. Laws 303(2).
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division would render the phrase
tion adopted by the appellate
"shall not be allowed" 15 5 meaningless, the court agreed that such a
result could be undesirable.15 6 Nevertheless, the court found that
to give that phrase its literal meaning would not comport with the
legislative intent. 5' 7 Moreover, Justice Garibaldi opined that the
express waiver provision more accurately represented the legislative intent.158 Furthermore, the court determined that the
clergyperson was to be the sole holder of the privilege because the
phrase "shall not be compelled"5 9 suggests that the clergyperson
may, at his or her discretion, either waive or invoke the privilege."
The majority articulated that because the principle rationale for
the priest-penitent privilege was to protect the clergyperson from
compelled 1disclosure, it was unnecessary to include the penitent as
1 6
a holder.
Finally, the court acknowledged various interpretations of the
priest-penitent privilege and conceded that most states do not confer the privilege solely upon the clergyperson.162 Justice Garibaldi,
however, emphasizing that the court was only construing the New
Jersey statute, held that the clergyperson holds the priest-penitent
privilege exclusively and accordingly may waive the privilege, without the penitent's consent, by disclosing confidential communica155 See supra note 137 for the specific language of the New Jersey priest-penitent
statute; see supra notes 138-43 and accompanying text for the majority's analysis of
N.J. EVD. R. 29.
156 Szemple, 135 N.J. at 431, 640 A.2d at 829-30 (quoting N.J. EVID. R. 29) (other
citations omitted). The defendant based his assertion on the well established statutory principle that courts should avoid a construction which renders part of a statute
superfluous. Id., 640 A.2d at 829.
157 Id., 640 A.2d at 830 (citations omitted). The majority further reasoned that the
"shall not be allowed" language was probably a remnant of an old rule of competency.
Id. (citations omitted).
158 Id. at 431-32, 640 A.2d at 830. (citations omitted).
159 See supra note 137 for the specific language of the New Jersey priest-penitent
statute; see supra notes 138-43 and accompanying text for the majority's analysis of

N.J.

EVID.

R. 29.

Id. at 432, 640 A.2d at 830. (citing Mitchell, supra note 4, at 755-56 n.181). Jusalso noted that when a legislature intends to grant the privilege to both
Garibaldi
tice
the penitent and the clergyperson, the statutory language usually qualifies the waiver
with a statement expressing the requirement of the penitent's consent. Id. (citations
omitted). The justice pointed out that N.J. EvID. R. 29 does not include this type of
language. Id.
161 Id. Justice Garibaldi conceded that the penitent's need for spiritual counseling
was valid, but was nonetheless unpersuaded that the penitent's comfort was a rationale behind N.J. Evw. R. 29. Id. (quoting Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 51
(1980)).
162 Id. at 432, 640 A.2d at 830 (citations omitted).
160
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tions.1 6 3 Consequently, the court affirmed the decision of the
16 4
appellate division disqualifying the privilege.
Justice Clifford authored a short concurrence with three cutting observations.1 65 First, the justice discredited the notion that
the chairmen of the Jacobs Committee and Bigelow Commission
did not understand the consequences of the Jacobs Committee Re166
port's comment that "the penitent . . . has no privilege at all."
The justice reasoned that for the committees "the penitent... has
1 67
Second, Justice Clifford
no privilege at all" meant exactly that.
confidential not beconfessions
keep
priests
generally
noted that
obligation requires
religious
their
because
cause of secular laws but
16
the ruling of the
despite
The justice posited that
them to do so.
court, priests will continue to obey the dictates of that higher
law. 169 Third, the justice agreed with the trial court that the person
to whom Szemple confessed did not qualify as a clergyperson
1 70
did not apply.
under N.J. Evid. R. 29, and thus the privilege
Justice Clifford expounded that it was unthinkable that a
171
The
priest would disclose the confidences of the confessional.
in
purpose
a
serve
may
justice noted, however, that the privilege
outlaw
the
of
the rare case where a priest believes the demands
1 72
Moreover, the justice reasoned
weigh the dictates of religion.
legislative intent when deterthe
misinterpreted
that if the court
mining the scope of the privilege, the legislature could simply
163 Id. at 433, 640 A.2d at 830. The court adopted this view in light of the statute's
history and previous interpretations by the Jacobs and Bigelow committees. Id.
164 Id.
165 Id. at 433-34, 640 A.2d at 830-31 (Clifford, J., concurring).
166 Id. at 433, 640 A.2d at 831 (Clifford, J., concurring) (quoting JACOBS COMM.
REP., supra note 62, at 77).
167 Id. The justice explained that neither of those scholars had ever had difficulty
expressing their views with complete accuracy. Id.
168 Id. at 434, 640 A.2d at 831 (Clifford, J., concurring). Justice Clifford referred to
the dissent's argument-that conferring the priest-penitent privilege upon the priest
deprived penitents of their right to confide in spiritual advisers-as "a fish of reddish
hue that diverts one's focus from the issue before us." Id. at 433, 640 A.2d at 831
(Clifford, J., concurring).
169 Id. at 434, 640 A.2d at 831 (Clifford, J., concurring). Moreover, the justice contended that if a priest chose to ignore religious obligations and reveal the confidences
of the confessional, such a disclosure would be a matter for the church, not the law.
Id.
170 Id. (quotation omitted).
171 Id.
172 Id. The justice found it implausible that "a priest to whom a penitent has disclosed, in the sacrament of confession, his or her pride, covetousness, lust, anger,
gluttony, envy, sloth, lawlessness, immorality, perversion, or lesser misdeeds would for
one moment entertain the thought of disclosure to any third person under any circumstances." Id.
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amend the statute.17 3
Justice O'Hern authored a stirring dissent regarding the
priest-penitent privilege.1 7 4 Thejustice first concluded that neither
the legislature nor the New Jersey Rules ofEvidence contemplated that
a clergyperson could freely disclose confidential spiritual conversations. 1 75 Next, the dissenting justice analyzed the purposes of the
priest-penitent privilege." 6 Justice O'Hern found privileges an exception to the general principle that "the public... has a right to
every [person's] evidence."1 7 7 Justice O'Hern stated that the most
prevalent rationale for the priest-penitent privilege was society's
need to encourage a positive penitential relationship. 17 According to the justice, most jurisdictions accomplish the goal of protectstatutes that grant
ing the priest-penitent relationship by enacting
179
the power of waiver solely to the penitent.
Justice O'Hern maintained that the NewJersey statute accommodates society's need by clearly providing that a clergyperson
173 Id. Justice Clifford commented that once the legislature amended the statute,
the judiciary could "launder the Evidence Rule accordingly." Id.
174 Id. (O'Hern, J., dissenting).
175 Id. at 434-35, 640 A.2d at 831 (O'Hern, J., dissenting). The dissent supported
that conclusion with three contentions: 1) most jurisdictions treat the privilege as
barring disclosure by the clergyperson; 2) New Jersey jurisprudence has never held
that a cleric may waive the Seal of Confession; and 3) such a fundamental change in
the law would never have been advised by the state committees on evidence without
definitive discussion of the issue. Id. at 435, 640 A.2d at 831 (O'Hern, J., dissenting).
176

Id.

Id. (alteration in original) (quoting 8 WiMoRE, supra note 3, § 2192, at 70).
Justice O'Hern quoted commentaries buttressing the view that the rules of privilege
were a justified exception because they are requirements of extrinsic policy. Id.
(quoting 8 WiGMoRE, supra note 3, § 2175, at 3). The justice pointed out that the
attorney-client privilege was not created to save attorneys the bother of appearing in
court, but rather to serve the greater objective of ensuring clients' confidentiality so
that they may consult openly with their attorneys. Id., 640 A.2d at 832 (O'Hern, J.,
dissenting) (citing State v. Toscano, 13 N.J. 418, 424 100 A.2d 170, 172 (1953) (holding that the attorney-client privilege is universally recognized on the basis of public
policy supporting freedom in communication between parties to special relationships)). The Szemple dissent noted that society deems those relationships important
enough to justify nondisclosure. Id. at 435-36, 640 A.2d at 832 (O'Hern, J., dissenting) (quoting Mitchell, supra note 4, at 762).
178 Id. at 435, 640 A.2d at 832 (O'Hern, J., dissenting). The justice noted that there
are many privileges, including the physician-patient, attorney-client, and marital communications privileges, that are designed to encourage special relationships by protecting the communications made pursuant to those relationships. Id. at 435-36, 640
A.2d at 832 (O'Hern,J., dissenting) (citation omitted). The dissent noted that these
relationships are protected because the law has concluded that fostering the relationships serves a greater purpose to society than does disclosing the communications. Id.
at 436, 640 A.2d at 832 (O'Hern, J., dissenting) (quotation omitted).
179 Id. (quoting Seidman v. Fishburne-Hudgins Educ. Found., Inc., 724 F.2d 413,
415 (4th Cir. 1984); and Keenan v. Gigante, 390 N.E.2d 1151, f1541N-Y_1979)).
177
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shall not be "allowed or compelled" to disclose confidential spiritual communications.1 8 ° The justice interpreted this language to
mean that a penitent must consent to disclosure and posited that
attaching such a meaning would be in accord with other jurisdictions. 1 ' The dissenting justice opined that requiring the penitent
to consent to disclosure best implements the policies underlying
18

the privilege.

2

Justice O'Hern next averred that the majority incorrectly focused on the Jacobs Committee Annotation to their comment on
proposed Unif. R. Evid. 29, which stated that, unlike the Uniform
Rule, under the NewJersey statute the penitent has no privilege at
all.18 3 The dissent asserted that the reason the statute did not
grant a privilege to the penitent was because it would have been
the
redundant: the 1955 version of the statute absolutely 18banned
4 The jusclerics.
by
communications
disclosure of confidential
tice concluded that the majority's deference to theJacobs Committee should be offset by the fact that the committee was analyzing a
statute that completely banned cleric disclosures, thus affording
the penitent inviolable protection.185 Moreover, the dissent asId. at 436-37, 640 A.2d at 832 (O'Hern,J., dissenting) (quoting N.J. EVID. R. 29).
Id. at 437, 640 A.2d at 832 (O'Hern,J., dissenting). The dissent continued the
analysis by noting that only three state statutes allow the clergyperson to disclose a
communication absent the penitent's consent. Id. Those statutes do not prohibit a
clergyperson from breaching spiritual confidences voluntarily, but rather only prohibit the clergyperson from being compelled to disclose. Id. (citing ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 735, para. 5/8-803 (Smith-Hurd 1992); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &JuD. PROC. § 9-111
(1989); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-400 (Michie 1992)). The dissent also noted that case
law in Illinois and Virginia supports this interpretation. Id. (citations omitted). The
justice further explained that although six other statutes do not appear to grant the
penitent a privilege, they do have that effect because the clergyperson is considered
an incompetent witness and thus is not allowed to testify at all. Id., 640 A.2d at 833
(O'Hern,J., dissenting) (citing GA. CODE ANN. § 24-9-22 (1982); INn. CODE ANN. § 341-14-5 (West 1983); MicH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 600.2156 (West 1986); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 491.060 (Vernon 1952); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1607 (1973); Wyo. STAT. § 1-12-101
(1988)).
182 Id.
183 Id. at 437-38, 640 A.2d at 833 (O'Hern, J., dissenting) (quoting JAcoBs CoMm.
REP., supra note 62, at 77); see supra note 148 (discussing the relevantJacobs Committee comments).
184 Szemple, 135 NJ. at 438, 640 A.2d at 833 (O'Hern,J., dissenting). In accordance
with that view, the dissenting justice contended that the question of privilege only
emerged once the Bigelow Commission recommended the inclusion of a waiver provision. Id. (footnote omitted).
a
185 Id. Moreover, the justice discounted the Jacobs Committee's concern that
clergyperson would be forced to disclose confidential communications in violation of
his or her religious duty, noting the Drafters' Comment to UNIF. R. EVID. 29 which
provided that either the priest or penitent may claim the privilege. Id. (quoting JAcoBs COMM. REP., supra note 62, at 76). The dissent reasoned that the Jacobs Coin180
181
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serted that while the concept that a clergyperson could be forced
to disclose spiritual confidences is troubling, the possibility that a
be disclosed against his or her wishes is
penitent's confession could
18 6
disturbing.
more
even
The dissent conceded that the statute did not explicitly confer
a privilege upon the penitent, yet noted that to do so would have
been unnecessary due to the statute's construction.18 7 Furthermore, the dissenting justice submitted that New Jersey case law did
not support the proposition that the penitent has no privilege."8 8
Justice O'Hern took particular exception to the court's view that
the Bigelow Commission's inclusion of a waiver provision indicated
has the power to unilaterally waive the
that the clergyperson
89
privilege.
The justice attested that the language of the statute is not demittee's fear could not be realized because if both the penitent and clergyperson hold
the privilege the penitent could not compel the clergyperson to disclose the communications. Id. at 439, 640 A.2d at 833 (O'Hem, J., dissenting). The Drafters' Comment to UNIF. R_ EVID. 29 provides in pertinent part: "This rule permits either priest,
broadly defined, or penitent to claim the privilege." JACOBS COMM. REP., supra note
62, at 76.
186 Szemple, 135 NJ. at 439, 640 A.2d at 833 (O'Hern, J., dissenting).
187 Id., 640 A.2d at 833-34 (O'Hern, J., dissenting).
188 Id., 640 A.2d at 834 (O'Hern, J. dissenting). Justice O'Hern criticized the majority's reliance on In re Murtha, finding the case inapplicable because the Murtha
court never reached the issue of who held the privilege. Id. (citing In re Murtha, 115
N.J. Super 380, 279 A.2d 889 (App. Div. 1971)). The justice contended that had the
court below reached the issue, it would have held that the privilege barred the testimony. Id.; see supra notes 110-15 and accompanying text for a further discussion of
Murtha.
189 Szemple, 135 N.J. at 439, 440, 640 A.2d at 834 (O'Hern, J., dissenting). Specifically, Justice O'Hern argued that "[t]he language of the waiver reference is most inept for the interpretation that the Court reaches." Id. at 440, 640 A.2d at 834
(O'Hern, J., dissenting). The justice admitted that the Bigelow Commission's inclusion of a waiver provision is troublesome. Id. at 439, 640 A.2d at 834 (O'Hern, J.,
dissenting). The dissent noted that until this case addressed the issue, it had been
assumed by the Commentary to the NewJersey Rules of Evidence that the Bigelow Commission's addition of the reference to the waiver provision was in error as it contravened the original goal of the statute. Id. at 439-40, 640 A.2d at 834 (O'Hem, J.,
dissenting) (quotation omitted).
The commentary to the New Jersey Rules of Evidence provides in relevant part:
The inclusion of this [waiver] provision by the Bigelow Commission was
probably in error because it contradicts the thrust of the rule and the
original statute, namely that under no circumstances should a religious
figure be considered as a source of evidence of this type. Since the
person who made the confidential communication is not the holder of
this privilege, no conduct on his part falling within the scope of Rule 37
can effectively compel disclosure by the religious figure.
RIcHADJ. BIUNNO, CuRRENT N.J. RuLas OF EVIDENCE, Comment 1 on N.J. EvID. R. 29,
at 416 (1993).
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monstrative of the intended meaning.19 ° Justice, O'Hern stated

that the majority's conclusion that the penitent had no privilege at
all emasculated one of the most privileged communications.191
The justice maintained that the majority's construction was not in
accordance with the legislative intent and further opined that, contrary to the finding of the majority, the statute unambiguously
stated that a cleric shall not be "allowed or compelled" to disclose a
spiritual confidence. 19 2 The dissent suggested that most penitents
190 Szemple, 135 NJ. at 440, 640 A.2d at 834 (O'Hern, J., dissenting). The justice
urged that the statutory language, with the exception of the heading, does not annunciate that the cleric even has a privilege. Id. Furthermore, the dissent posited that the
waiver provision of NJ. EVID. R.37 is out of context in N.J. EVID. R. 29 and that when
the meaning attributed to a statute is not conveyed by the language, it can be inferred
that the Legislature did not intend the attributed meaning. Id. at 440-41, 640 A.2d at
834 (O'Hern,J., dissenting). The dissenting justice argued that "[ t ] he generic provisions of Evidence Rule 37 simply do not fit the context of Evidence Rule 29." Id. The
dissent found it incongruous to interpret the privilege as conferring a right of waiver
upon the clergyperson when the language of the privilege clearly states that clerics
may not testify. Id. at 441, 640 A.2d at 835 (O'Hern, J., dissenting). The justice further stated that to rationalize this interpretation with absurd scenarios, as envisioned
by the majority, was unthinkable. Id. The dissent specifically characterized as ridiculous three of the majority's scenarios: 1) a priest contracting with someone not to
claim the privilege; 2) a clergyperson who would consent to a disclosure made by
anyone; and 3) a clergyperson who would disclose without coercion. Id. Further, the
justice discounted the following situations: "a priest who would blurt out at a social
gathering that penitent Jones mentioned during confession that he has visited a
crack house, or a priest who would give consent to Smith, who happened to be standing near the confessional, to discloseJones's confession." Id. Thejustice further contended that it was unnecessary for the Bigelow Commission to qualify the waiver
provision-by explaining that a cleric could not disclose without the penitent's consent-because the public would simply assume that a cleric would not destroy the
inviolability of the confessional. Id. The dissenting justice proffered that the Bigelow
commission may have included the waiver provision to prevent a penitent who had
already disclosed a communication from retracting and asserting the privilege. Id.
191 Id. The justice opined that the majority's conclusion could not possibly effectuate the legislature's intent because courts have construed all the other evidentiary
privileges to confer the privilege upon the confider. Id. at 441-42, 640 A.2d at 835
(O'Hern,J., dissenting). The dissent demonstrated that the legislature concurrently
codified all the evidentiary privileges and that it would be an anomaly to construe one
as affording less protection than the other. Id. at 442, 640 A.2d at 835 (O'Hern, J.,
dissenting).
192 Id. (quoting NJ. EVID. R. 29). The dissent further challenged the majority's
conclusion by arguing that the legislature would not have deprived citizens of their
constitutional right to confide in spiritual counselors without earnest debate on the
issue. Id. In this regard, the dissent noted the argument raised by the American Civil
Liberties Union (ACLU) alleging that vesting the power of waiver in the clergyperson
unconstitutionally burdens the penitent's right of free exercise of religion. Id. The
justice agreed with the contention that NJ. EVID. R 29 is not narrowly tailored to a
compelling state interest. Id. Justice O'Hern recognized that the state's interest
could be compelling in certain instances, such as child abuse, however the justice
maintained that the majority's interpretation of N.J. EVID. R 29 denies the penitent
the right to prevent disclosure in any circumstance. Id.
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would find the fact that they have no right to confidentiality in the
confessional unthinkable and an affront to their religious principles. 1 93 Hence, Justice O'Hern opined that the majority's interpretation of the statutory language subverted the legislative intent,
and thus should not be permitted. 9 4
Justice O'Hern found this case particularly shocking because,
had the defendant confided in an attorney or psychiatrist as opposed to a spiritual advisor, he would have been able to bar disclosure of those communications.' 95 The justice further contended
that the purpose behind the priest-penitent privilege is not served
when a priest is allowed to testify against a penitent to whom he or
she provided counseling. 196 The justice concluded by noting that
and that it belongs to
the privilege exists to protect the 19penitent,
7
both the priest and the penitent.
The narrow interpretation afforded both the marital communication and priest-penitent privileges by the Szemple court exemplifies the proper judicial approach. By construing the marital
communication privilege narrowly, the court correctly determined
193 Id. According to Justice O'Hern, the notion of a legislator advancing such a
position was doubtful. Id. at 443, 640 A.2d at 835-36 (O'Hern, J., dissenting). The
dissent illustrated this point by questioning what reaction would have followed in
1957 if a legislator stated, "I want the clergy to be able to disclose confessions at will,
no matter what the person giving the confession wants, because the sanctity of religious confessions must give way to the needs of a lawsuit." Id. at 442-43, 640 A.2d at
835 (O'Hern, J., dissenting). The justice noted that penitents would react negatively
to that position despite continued trust in their spiritual advisors. Id. at 442, 640 A.2d
at 835 (O'Hern, J., dissenting).
194 Id. at 443, 640 A.2d at 836 (O'Hern, J., dissenting). Justice O'Hem stated that
because the judiciary accords the legislature great deference on how to serve its purposes, to read a statute in a manner that directly contravenes the legislative intent is
undesirable. Id. (citations omitted). Further, the dissent noted that the language of
N.J. EvID. R_ 29 and N.J. EVID. R. 37 strengthens the conclusion that the Legislature
did not intend to confer the privilege solely on the clergyperson. Id. The justice did,
however, acknowledge instances in which the legislature may wish to modify the privilege, such as cases of child abuse. Id. The dissent conceded, however, that no such
legislative change has currently been made. Id.
195 Id. at 444, 640 A.2d at 835 (O'Hern, J., dissenting).
196 Id. The dissent restated the purpose of the privilege: to encourage the relationship between a clergyperson and a penitent. Id. The dissent suspected that the issues
in this case would not again be confronted by the court, as it is rare for a clergyperson
to betray the confidences of the confessional. Id. The dissenting justice also opined
that defendant's case should not turn on the success of his spiritual encounters. Id.
197 Id. The justice remarked that "[t]he clergy privilege exists not for the cleric to
choose among the worthy members of the flock, but to furnish a 'secure repository
for the confessant's confidences."' Id. (quoting Seidman v. Fishburne-Hudgins Educ.
Found., Inc., 724 F.2d 413, 415 (4th Cir. 1984)). In accordance with that view, the
dissent opined that a conviction based on the disclosure of a confidential communication between cleric and penitent could not be sustained. Id.
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that unsolicited third party intervention destroys the confidential
nature of a marital communication and thus renders the communication unprotected.19 The court properly abolished the inadvertency requirements. 99 This prerequisite was antiquated and
served no purpose in modem jurisprudence. Unfortunately, the
court dealt with the issue of "surreptitious appropriation" in a very
cursory manner.20 0 The court did not determine, for purposes of
future litigation, whether surreptitious appropriation would justify
the protection of the privilege, nor did the court define "surreptitious appropriation." By providing such guidelines, the court
could have avoided unnecessary future adjudications. Furthermore, though the holding is tailored to the demands of today's
society, it must be noted that as technology advances, methods of
intercepting private communications, such as wiretaps, may render
third party disclosure unfair and a true affront to the notion of
privacy.
With respect to the priest-penitent privilege, the court properly noted that the privilege was meant to protect the clergyperson. 20 1 The majority, however, in emphasizing the clergyperson's
rights, scarcely noted the rights of the penitent. Many theorists believe that the penitent's rights were also an issue when creating the
privilege.20 2 Ignoring this idiosyncracy, the court found that the
clergyperson unilaterally holds the privilege. Further, the court
did not even consider the interpretation that both parties may hold
the privilege. The dissent pointed out that such an interpretation
20 3
would further the majority's goal of protecting the clergyperson.
Had the court taken this approach, it would have joined a strong
minority of states.204 Furthermore, the majority based its argument
almost exclusively upon the interpretations and recommendations
of the Jacobs Committee and Bigelow Commission. Despite the
eminence of those legal commentaries, the past four decades have
eroded the validity of the committee's determinations. The needs
198 Cf id. at 420, 640 A.2d at 824 (holding that the communication at issue was not
privileged and was properly admitted).
199 Cf id. at 418-19, 640 A.2d at 823 (determining that the inadvertency requirement does not apply third party acquisition of confidential communications).
200 See id. at 420, 640 A.2d at 824 (addressing the issue of surreptitious
appropriation).
201 Cf. id. at 424, 640 A.2d at 826 (finding that the history of the privilege tends to
indicate that the focus of protection lies with the dergyperson).
202 See, e.g., 8 WmMoRE, supra note 3, § 2394, at 869.
203 Szemple, 135 N.J. at 438-39, 640 A.2d at 833 (O'Hern, J., dissenting).
204 See Mayes, supra note 21, at 400 ("Under the minority view, however, the privilege is said to exist for the benefit of both parties.....").
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of society change frequently in today's fast-paced world. Those
changes should be taken into account before basing a statutory interpretation upon dated principles.
The reach of this case will have a profound negative effect on
the entire New Jersey judicial system. As noted in the dissent, the
20 5
waiver may extend to an extraordinarily broad range of cases.
The court will eventually be forced to address this issue as it
presents a substantial infringement upon people's daily activities.
To allow clergypersons to testify in court is quite different than
compelling them to do so. Clergypersons are not currently compelled to disclose information in courts, thus, the decision in this
case is not as catastrophic as first thought. The Seal of Confession
will still prevent priests from disclosures, as will similar beliefs or
doctrines in other religions. It is, however, quite frightening that
the key to one's religious privacy rests in the hands of another.
Furthermore, people whose religions do not have a doctrine regarding confidentiality have no guarantee of religious autonomy or
a true feeling of free exercise.
Free exercise of religion is guaranteed by the United States
Constitution2 6 and cannot be infringed upon unless there is a
compelling state interest. 0 7 The Szemple majority never explicitly
addressed the Free Exercise clause. Nevertheless, the clergyperson's Free Exercise rights are by implication and by effect protected by the court's decision. Except for a brief mention in the
08
dissent, the court ignored the penitent's right to Free Exercise.
The court's determination that the privilege belongs solely to the
clergyperson functionally implicates a countervailing interest of
Free Exercise on the part of the penitent. The majority decision
29
results in a "unilateral bestowal of ecclesiastical prerogative"
without the reciprocal choice based on the penitent's Free Exer205 See Szemple, 135 NJ. at 443 n.3, 640 A.2d at 836 n.3 (O'Hem, J., dissenting)
(noting that a simple tax matter could warrant invocation of the privilege).
206 U.S. CONST. amend. I
207 See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-04 (1940) (holding that the free
exercise of religion is part of the fundamental concept of liberty embodied in the
Fourteenth Amendment and is thus applicable to the States and subject to strict scrutiny). In People v. Phillips, the New York court relied on the New York Constitution
and upheld the priest-penitent privilege on free exercise grounds. PrivilegedCommunications to Clergymen, supra note 21, at 206, 209 (reprinting the original, unreported
opinion). See supra note 21 for a discussion of the holding and rationale in Phillips.
208 Cf Szemple, 135 NJ. at 442, 640 A.2d at 835 (O'Hern,J., dissenting) (mentioning
an ACLU contention that a denial of the priest-penitent privilege to the penitent
violates the Free Exercise Clause).
209 Brief for the American Civil Liberties Union at 11, State v. Szemple, 135 N.J.
406-640-A2d-817-(1994).
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cise rights. The right to free exercise of religion does not belong
exclusively to the clergyperson. Such an interpretation would
make the privilege a benefit of ecclesiastical office and not a protection of free exercise. Protection should also have been afforded
the penitent to eradicate the Free Exercise conflict.
In response to Szemple, the New Jersey Legislature passed remedial legislation signed into law in October 1994.210 The legislation (S-1164) amended NJ.RE. 511 to specifically provide that
both penitent and clergyperson hold the privilege and that the
privilege is not waivable. 2 1 1 The purpose of this legislation is to
balance two "very real and very sincere interests" and effectively
overcomes the priest-penitent portion of the Szemple decision.2 12
Kristina K. Pappa

210 See supra note 29 and accompanying text (describing the legislative response to
the Szemple decision).
211 1994 NJ. Laws 123.
212 Telephone Interview with Senator William Gormley (August 1, 1994). The legislation was reconsidered due to Governor Whitman's conditional veto, which sent
the bill back to the legislature with recommended changes. Tim O'Brien, Whitman
Seeks Changes; Nixes 'Piest-Penitent' Bil 137 N.J. L.J. 1843 (1994). Governor Whitman's
proposed changes sought to make the privilege more balanced by allowing waiver
upon the consent of both parties and permitting clerics to tell police of plans of future crime. Id. The changes still protect the priest from compelled disclosure and
thus, are in accordance with the intent of the original bill. Id. Governor Whitman
signed the revised bill into law on October 27, 1994. See Weissman, supra note 29, at
A7.

